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Summary
This report provides an overview of federal law governing wiretapping and
electronic eavesdropping.  It also surveys state law in the area and contains a
bibliography of legal commentary.
It is a federal crime to wiretap or to use a machine to capture the
communications of others without court approval, unless one of the parties has given
their prior consent.  It is likewise a federal crime to use or disclose any information
acquired by illegal wiretapping or electronic eavesdropping.  Violations can result in
imprisonment for not more than 5 years; fines up to $250,000 (up to $500,000 for
organizations); in civil liability for damages, attorneys fees and possibly punitive
damages; in disciplinary action against any attorneys involved; and in suppression of
any derivative evidence.  Congress has created separate but comparable protective
schemes for electronic mail (e-mail) and against the surreptitious use of telephone call
monitoring practices such as pen registers and trap and trace devices.
Each of these protective schemes comes with a procedural mechanism to afford
limited law enforcement access to private communications and communications
records under conditions consistent with the dictates of the Fourth Amendment.  The
government has been given even more narrowly confined authority to engage in
wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping in the name of foreign intelligence gathering
in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.
Three issues in the area at one time proved particularly difficult to resolve.  They
involve cellular telephones, digital telephony, and encryption.  Intentionally
intercepting any telephone conversation has long been a federal crime.  Congress has
adjusted federal law to make it clear that intentionally intercepting a telephone
conversation involving the use of cellular telephone is a crime.
Companies that provide telephone and other communications services have long
cooperated in the law enforcement execution of court orders authorizing wiretapping
and electronic eavesdropping.  Digital telephony and the explosion of other
technological advances have made that assistance both more difficult and more
expensive.  Congress passed the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement
Act (CALEA) to help pay communication service providers for the cost of
configuring their systems to accommodate law enforcement needs.
Encryption is a means of protecting any computer-related communication from
wiretapping or interception.  The federal government has been instrumental in the
development of more robust encryption technology to protect government and private
information.  Export restrictions, challenged on First Amendment grounds, have been
relaxed.
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1  Portions of this report draw upon a series of earlier reports, no longer available, entitled:
Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance: A Brief Discussion of Pertinent Supreme Court
Cases, A Summary and Compilation of Federal State Statutes, and a Selected Legal
Bibliography (1970); Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance: A Brief Discussion of
Pertinent Supreme Court Cases, A Summary and Compilation of Federal State Statutes, and
a Selected Legal Bibliography (1971); Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance: Federal
and State Statutes (1974); Taps and Bugs: A Compilation of Federal and State Statutes
Governing the Interception of Wire and Oral Communications (1981); The Interception of
Communications: A Legal Overview of Bugs and Taps (1988); Wiretapping & Electronic
Surveillance: The Electronic Communications Privacy Act and Related Matters (1992);
Taps, Bugs & Telephony: An Overview of Federal Statutes Governing Wiretapping and
Electronic Eavesdropping (1998). 
As used in this report “electronic eavesdropping” refers to the use of hidden
microphones, recorders and any other mechanical or electronic means of capturing
communications, other than wiretapping (tapping into telephone conversations).  In previous
versions of this report and other earlier writings, it was common to use a more neutral term
– electronic surveillance – at least when referring to law enforcement use.  Unfortunately,
continued use of the term “electronic surveillance” rather than “electronic eavesdropping”
risks confusion with forms of surveillance that either have individualistic definitions (e.g.,
“electronic surveillance” under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 18 U.S.C. 1801(f)),
that involve surveillance that does not capture conversation (e.g., thermal imaging or
electronic tracking devices), or that may or may not capture conversation (e.g., video
surveillance which when it does capture conversation is covered by the law governing
electronic eavesdropping, see United States v. Williams, 124 F.3d 411 (3d Cir. 1997).
Privacy: An Overview of Federal Statutes
Governing Wiretapping and Electronic
Eavesdropping
INTRODUCTION1
Depending on one’s perspective, wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping are
either “dirty business,” essential law enforcement tools, or both.  This is a very general
overview of the federal statutes that proscribe wiretapping and electronic
eavesdropping and of the procedures they establish for law enforcement and foreign
intelligence gathering purposes.  Special attention is given to three particularly
troublesome areas of the law: digital telephony, cell phone interception, and
encryption.  Although the specifics of state law are beyond the scope of this report,
citations to related state statutory provisions and a selected bibliography of legal
materials have been appended.
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2 “Eavesdropping is indictable at the common law, not only in England but in our states.  It
is seldom brought to the attention of the courts, and our books contain too few decisions upon
it to enable an author to define it with confidence. . . . It never occupied much space in the
law, and it has nearly faded from the legal horizon.” 1 BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CRIMINAL LAW, 670 (1882).
3  By the time of the landmark Supreme Court decision in Olmstead in 1928, at least forty-one
of the forty-eight states had banned wiretapping or forbidden telephone and telegraph
employees and officers from disclosing the content of telephone or telegraph messages or both.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479-80 n.13 (1928)(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Olmstead is remembered most today for the dissents of Holmes and Brandeis, but for four
decades it stood for the view that the Fourth Amendment’s search and seizure commands did
not apply to government wiretapping accomplished without a trespass onto private property.
4  40 Stat.1017-18 (1918)(“whoever during the period of governmental operation of the
telephone and telegraph systems of the United States . . . shall, without authority and without
the knowledge and consent of the other users thereof, except as may be necessary for
operation of the service, tap any telegraph or telephone line . . . or whoever being employed
in any such telephone or telegraph service shall divulge the contents of any such telephone or
telegraph message to any person not duly authorized or entitled the receive the same, shall be
fined not exceeding $1,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year or both”); 56 Cong.Rec.
10761-765 (1918).
5  44 Stat. 1172 (1927)(“. . . no person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any
message and divulge or publish the contents, substance, purpose, effect, or meaning of such
intercepted message to any person . . .”).
6  Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479-80 n.13 (1928)(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
(continued...)
BACKGROUND
At common law, “eavesdroppers, or such as listen under walls or windows, or
the eaves of a house, to hearken after discourse, and thereupon to frame slanderous
and mischievous tales, are a common nuisance and presentable at the court-leet; or
are indictable at the sessions, and punishable by fine and finding of sureties for [their]
good behavior,” 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, 169
(1769).
Although early American law proscribed common law eavesdropping, the crime
was little prosecuted and by the late nineteenth century had “nearly faded from the
legal horizon.”2  With the invention of the telegraph and telephone, however, state
laws outlawing wiretapping or indiscretion by telephone and telegraph operators
preserved the spirit of the common law prohibition in this country.3  
Congress enacted the first federal wiretap statute as a temporary measure to
prevent disclosure of government secrets during World War I.4  Later, it proscribed
intercepting and divulging private radio messages in the Radio Act of 1927,5 but did
not immediately reestablish a federal wiretap prohibition.   By the time of the
landmark Supreme Court decision in Olmstead however, at least forty-one of the
forty-eight states had banned wiretapping or forbidden telephone and telegraph
employees and officers from disclosing the content of telephone or telegraph
messages or both.6 
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Olmstead is remembered most today for the dissents of Holmes and Brandeis, but for four
decades it stood for the view that the Fourth Amendment’s search and seizure commands did
not apply to government wiretapping accomplished without a trespass onto private property
7  Curtilage originally meant the land and buildings enclosed by the walls of a castle; in later
usage it referred to the barns, stables, garden plots and the like immediately proximate to a
dwelling; it is understood in Fourth Amendment parlance to describe that area which “harbors
those intimate activities associated with domestic life and the privacies of the home,” United
States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 n.4 (1987).
8  Olmstead had not been compelled to use his phone and so the Court rejected his Fifth
Amendment challenge. 277 U.S.C. at 462.  Any violation of the Washington state wiretap
statute was thought insufficient to warrant the exclusion of evidence, 277 U.S. at 466-68.
Justice Holmes in his dissent tersely characterized the conduct of federal wiretappers as “dirty
business,” 277 U.S. at 470.  The dissent of Justice Brandeis observed that the drafters of the
Constitution “conferred as against the Government, the right to be let alone – the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.  To protect that right,
every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government against privacy of the individual whatever the
means employed, must be deemed in violation of the Fourth Amendment,” 277 U.S. at 478-79.
9  “Congress may of course protect the secrecy of telephone messages by making them, when
intercepted inadmissible in evidence in federal criminal trials, by direct legislation,” 277 U.S.
at 465.
10  48 U.S.C. 1103-4 (1934), 47 U.S.C. 605 (1940 ed.).  The Act neither expressly condemned
law enforcement interceptions nor called for the exclusion of wiretap evidence, but it was read
to encompass both, Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937); Nardone v. United
States, 308 U.S. 321 (1939). 
Olmstead was a Seattle bootlegger whose Prohibition Act conviction was the
product of a federal wiretap.  He challenged his conviction on three grounds, arguing
unsuccessfully that the wiretap evidence should have been suppressed as a violation
of either his Fourth Amendment rights, his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination, or the rights implicit in the Washington state statute that outlawed
wiretapping.
For a majority of the Court, writing through Chief Justice Taft, Olmstead’s
Fourth Amendment challenge was doomed by the absence of “an official search and
seizure of his person, or such a seizure of his papers or his tangible material effects,
or an actual physical invasion of his house or curtilage7 for the purposes of making a
seizure,” 277 U.S. at 466.8
Chief Justice Taft pointed out that Congress was free to provide protection
which the Constitution did not.9  Congress did so in the 1934 Communications Act
by expanding the Radio Act’s proscription against intercepting and divulging radio
communications so as to include intercepting and divulging radio or wire
communications.10
The Federal Communications Act outlawed wiretapping, but it said nothing
about the use of machines to surreptitiously record and transmit face to face
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11  Section 605 did ban the interception and divulgence of radio broadcasts but it did not reach
the radio transmission of conversations that were broadcast unbeknownst to all of the parties
to the conversation.  Late in the game, the FCC supplied a partial solution when it banned the
use of licensed radio equipment to overhear or record private conversation without the consent
of all the parties involved in the conversation, 31 Fed.Reg. 3400 (March 4, 1966), amending
then 47 C.F.R. §§2.701, 15.11.  The FCC excluded “operations of any law enforcement
offices conducted under lawful authority,” id.
12  The volume of all Fourth Amendment cases calling for Supreme Court review increased
dramatically after Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), acknowledged the application of the
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule to the states.
13 “The absence of a physical invasion of the petitioner’s premises was also a vital factor in
the Court’s decision in Olmstead v. United States . . . . In holding that the wiretapping there
did not violate the Fourth Amendment, the Court noted that the insertions were made without
trespass upon any property of the defendants.  They were made in the basement of the large
office building.  The taps from house lines were made in the streets near the houses.  277 U.S.
at 457. There was no entry of the houses or offices of the defendants.  277 U.S. at 464.
Relying upon these circumstances, the Court reasoned that the intervening wires are not part
of (the defendant’s) house or office any more than are the highways along which they are
stretched.  277 U.S. at 465.
“Here, by contrast, the officers overheard the petitioners’ conversations only by usurping
part of the petitioners’ house or office – a heating system which was an integral part of the
premises occupied by the petitioners, a usurpation that was effected without their knowledge
and without their consent.  In these circumstances we need not pause to consider whether or
not there was a technical trespass under the local property law relating to party walls. Inherent
(continued...)
conversations.11  In the absence of a statutory ban the number of surreptitious
recording cases decided on Fourth Amendment grounds surged and the results began
to erode Olmstead’s underpinnings.12
Erosion, however, came slowly.  Initially the Court applied Olmstead’s principles
to these electronic eavesdropping cases.  Thus, the use of a dictaphone to secretly
overhear a private conversation in an adjacent office offended no Fourth Amendment
precipes because no physical trespass into the office in which the conversation took
place had occurred, Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942).  Similarly, the
absence of a physical trespass precluded Fourth Amendment coverage of the situation
where a federal agent secretly recorded his conversation with a defendant held in a
commercial laundry in an area open to the public, On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S.
747 (1952).  On the other hand, the Fourth Amendment did reach the government’s
physical intrusion upon private property during an investigation, as for example when
they drove a “spike mike” into the common wall of a row house until it made contact
with a heating duct for the home in which the conversation occurred, Silverman v.
United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961). 
Silverman presented something of a technical problem, because there was some
question whether the spike mike had actually crossed the property line of the
defendant’s town house when it made contact with the heating duct.  The Court
declined to rest its decision on the technicalities of local property law, and instead
found that the government’s conduct had intruded upon privacy of home and hearth
in a manner condemned by the Fourth Amendment, 365 U.S. at 510-12.13
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13(...continued)
Fourth Amendment rights are not inevitably measurable in terms of ancient niceties of tort or
real property law . . . .
 “The Fourth Amendment, and the personal rights which it secures, have a long history.
At the very core stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from
unreasonable governmental intrusion . . . This Court has never held that a federal officer may
without warrant and without consent physically entrench into a man’s office or home, there
secretly observe or listen, and relate at the man’s subsequent criminal trial what was seen or
heard.
“A distinction between the dictaphone employed in Goldman and the spike mike utilized
here seemed to the Court of Appeals too fine a one to draw.  The court was unwilling to
believe that the respective rights are to be measured in fractions of inches.  But decision here
does not turn upon the technicality of a trespass upon a party wall as a matter of local law.
It is based upon the reality of an actual intrusion into a constitutionally protected area.  What
the Court said long ago bears repeating now: It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its
mildest and least repulsive form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first
footing in that way, namely, by silent approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of
procedure.  Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635.  We find no occasion to re-examine
Goldman here, but we decline to go beyond it, by even a fraction of an inch,” 365 U.S. at 510-
12 (internal quotation marks omitted).
14  “We conclude that the underpinnings of Olmstead and Goldman have been so eroded by
our subsequent decisions that the trespass doctrine there enunciated can no longer be regarded
as controlling.  The Government’s activities in electronically listening to and recording the
petitioner’s words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied while using the
telephone booth and thus constituted a search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.  The fact that the electronic device employed to achieve that end did not happen
to penetrate the wall of the booth can have no constitutional significance.” Later courts seem
to prefer the “expectation of privacy” language found in Justice Harlan’s concurrence: “My
understanding of the rule that has emerged from prior decisions is that there is a twofold
requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy
(continued...)
Each of these cases focused upon whether a warrantless trespass onto private
property had occurred, that is, whether the means of conducting a search and seizure
had been so unreasonable as to offend the Fourth Amendment. Yet in each case, the
object of the search and seizure had been not those tangible papers or effects for
which the Fourth Amendment’s protection had been traditionally claimed, but an
intangible, a  conversation.  This enlarged view of the Fourth Amendment could
hardly be ignored, for [i]t follows from . . . Silverman . . . that the Fourth Amendment
may protect against the overhearing of verbal statements as well as against the more
traditional seizure of papers and effects,” Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,
485 (1963).
Soon thereafter the Court repudiated the notion that the Fourth Amendment’s
protection was contingent upon some trespass to real property, Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347 (1967). Katz was a bookie convicted on the basis of evidence gathered
by an electronic listening and recording device set up outside the public telephone
booth that Katz used to take and place bets.  The Court held that the gateway for
Fourth Amendment purposes stood at that point where an individual should to able
to expect that his or her privacy would not be subjected to unwarranted governmental
intrusion, 389 U.S. at 353.14
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and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable,”
389 U.S. at 361
15  18 U.S.C. 2511(3)(1970 ed.)(“Nothing contained in this chapter or in section 605 of the
Communications Act . . . shall limit the constitutional power of the President to take such
measures as he deems necessary to protect the Nation against actual or potential attack or
other hostile acts of a foreign power, to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed
essential to the security of the United States, or to protect national security information against
foreign intelligence activities. . .”).
One obvious consequence of Fourth Amendment coverage of wiretapping and
other forms of electronic eavesdropping is the usual attachment of the Amendment’s
warrant requirement. To avoid constitutional problems and at the same time preserve
wiretapping and other forms of electronic eavesdropping as a law enforcement tool,
some of the states established a statutory system under which law enforcement
officials could obtain a warrant, or equivalent court order, authorizing wiretapping or
electronic eavesdropping.
The Court rejected the constitutional adequacy of one of the more detailed of
these state statutory schemes in Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).  The statute
was found deficient its failure to require: 
• a particularized description of the place to be searched;
• a particularized description of the crime to which the search and seizure
related; 
• a particularized description of the conversation to be seized;
• limitations to prevent general searches; 
• termination of the interception when the conversation sought had been seized;
• prompt execution of the order; 
• return to the issuing court detailing the items seized; and
• any showing exigent circumstances to overcome the want of prior notice. 388
U.S. at 58-60.
Berger help persuade Congress to enact Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 87 Stat. 197, 18 U.S.C. 2510 - 2520 (1970 ed.), a
comprehensive wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping statute that not only
outlawed both in general terms but that permitted federal and state law enforcement
officers to use them under strict limitations designed to meet the objections in Berger.
A decade later another Supreme Court case persuaded Congress to supplement
Title III with a judicially supervised procedure for the use of wiretapping and
electronic eavesdropping in foreign intelligence gathering situations.
When Congress passed Title III there was some question over the extent of the
President’s inherent powers to authorize wiretaps – without judicial approval – in
national security cases.  As a consequence, the issue was simply removed from the
Title III scheme.15  After the Court held that the President’s inherent powers were
insufficient to excuse warrantless electronic eavesdropping on purely domestic threats
to national security, United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297
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(1972), Congress considered it prudent to augment the foreign intelligence gathering
authority of the United States with the Foreign Intelligence Security Act of 1978, 92
Stat. 1783, 50 U.S.C. 1801 - 1811.  The Act provides a procedure for judicial review
and authorization or denial of wiretapping and other forms of electronic
eavesdropping for purposes of foreign intelligence gathering. 
In 1986, Congress recast Title III in the Electronic Communications Privacy Act
(ECPA), 100 Stat. 1848, 18 U.S.C. 2510 - 2521. The Act followed the general
outline of Title III with adjustments and additions.  Like Title III, it sought to strike
a balance between the interests of privacy and law enforcement, but it also reflected
a Congressional desire to avoid unnecessarily crippling infant industries in the fields
of advanced communications technology,  H.R.Rep.No. 647, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.
18-9 (1984); S.Rep.No. 541, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1986). 
The Act also included new protection and law enforcement access provisions for
stored wire and electronic communications and transactional records access (e-mail
and phone records), 100 Stat. 1860, 18 U.S.C. 2701 - 2710, and for pen registers as
well as trap and trace devices (devices for recording the calls placed to or from a
particular telephone), 100 Stat. 1868, 18 U.S.C. 3121 - 3126.
In a more recent adjustment, the Communications Assistance for Law
Enforcement Act (CALEA), 108 Stat. 4179, 47 U.S.C. 1001 - 1010 (inter alia),
established a procedure designed to help police keep pace with telecommunications
advances and to provide tighter protection for e-mail and cordless telephone
communications.  The current result of Congress’s legislative efforts, Title III/ECPA
and related provisions, is an array of criminal prohibitions augmented by procedural
schemes crafted to give government access to private communications in limited
circumstances, ordinarily under judicial supervision.
CRIMES 
Generally
Unless otherwise provide, Title III/ECPA outlaws wiretapping and other forms
of electronic eavesdropping, possession of wiretapping or electronic eavesdropping
equipment, use or disclosure of information obtained through illegal wiretapping or
electronic eavesdropping, and in order to obstruct justice, disclosure of information
secured through court-ordered wiretapping or electronic eavesdropping, 18 U.S.C.
2511.  There are separate crimes for:
• unlawful access to stored e-mail communications, 18 U.S.C. 2701;
• unlawful use of a pen register or a trap and trace device, 18 U.S.C. 3121; and
• abuse of eavesdropping authority under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act, 50 U.S.C. 1809.
Illegal Wiretapping and Electronic Eavesdropping
At the heart of Title III/ECPA lies the prohibition against illegal wiretapping and
electronic eavesdropping, 18 U.S.C. 2511(1), that proscribes:
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16  Although the governmental entities are not subject to criminal liability, as noted infra, the
courts believe them subject to civil liability under 18 U.S.C. 2520.
17 “In order to underscore that the inadvertent reception of a protected communication is not
a crime, the subcommittee changed the state of mind requirement under Title III of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 from <willful’ to <intentional,’”
S.REP.NO. 541, 99th  Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1986); “This provision makes clear that the
inadvertent interception of a protected communication is not unlawful under this Act,”
H.REP.NO. 647, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 48-9 (1986). 
• any person from
• intentionally
• intercepting, or endeavoring to intercept, or
• wire, oral or electronic communications
• by using an electronic, mechanical or other device 
• unless the conduct is specifically authorized or expressly not covered, e.g.
- one of the parties to the conversation has consent to the interception
- the interception occurs in compliance with a statutorily authorized,
judicially supervised law enforcement or foreign intelligence gathering
interception,
- the interception occurs as part of providing or regulating communi-cation
services, 
- some kinds of radio broadcasts, and 
- in some places, spousal wiretappers.  
Subject to the same exceptions, section 2511 also protects wire, oral and
electronic communications from any person who intentionally:
• discloses or endeavors to disclose information with reason to know it has been
unlawfully intercepted, or 
• uses or endeavors to use information with reason to know it has been
unlawfully intercepted, or
• discloses or endeavors to disclose information with intent to obstruct justice
and with reason to know the information was secured through a court-ordered
interception. 
Person
The prohibition applies to “any employee, or agent of the United States or any
State or political subdivision thereof, and any individual, partnership, association, joint
stock company, trust, or corporation,” 18 U.S.C. 2510(6).16
Intentional
Conduct can only violate Title III/ECPA if it is done “intentionally,” inadvertent
conduct is no crime; the offender must have done on purpose those things which are
outlawed.17
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18  “(1) Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter any person who – (a)
intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to intercept or
endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic communication;
“(b) intentionally uses, endeavors to use, or procures any other person to use or endeavor
to use any electronic, mechanical, or other device to intercept any oral communication when
– (i) such device is affixed to, or otherwise transmits a signal through, a wire, cable, or other
like connection used in wire communication; or  “(ii) such device transmits communications
by radio, or interferes with the transmission of such communication; or (iii) such person
knows, or has reason to know, that such device or any component thereof has been sent
through the mail or transported in interstate or foreign commerce; or (iv) such use or endeavor
to use (A) takes place on the premises of any business or other commercial establishment the
operations of which affect interstate or foreign commerce; or (B) obtains or is for the purpose
of obtaining information relating to the operations of any business or other commercial
establishment the operations of which affect interstate or foreign commerce; or (v) such person
acts in the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or any territory or
possession of the United States,” 18 U.S.C. 2511(1)(a),(b).
19  “Subparagraph (a) establishes a blanket prohibition against the interception of wire
communication.  Since the facilities used to transmit wire communications form part of the
interstate or foreign communications network, Congress has plenary power under the
commerce clause to prohibit all interception of such communications whether by wiretapping
or otherwise.
“The broad prohibition of subparagraph (a) is also applicable to the interception of oral
communications.  The interception of such communications, however, does not necessarily
interfere with the interstate or foreign commerce network, and the extent of the constitutional
power of Congress to prohibit such interception is less clear than in the case of interception
of wire communications. . . .
“Therefore, in addition to the broad prohibitions of subparagraph (a), the committee has
included subparagraph (b), which relies on accepted jurisdictional bases under the commerce
clause, and other provisions of the Constitution to prohibit the interception of oral
communications,” S.REP.NO.1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 91-2 (1968).
Jurisdiction
Section 2511(1) contains two interception bars – one, 2511(1)(a), simply
outlaws intentional interception; the other, 2511(1)(b), outlaws intentional
interception when committed under any of five jurisdictional circumstances.18
Congress adopted the approach because of concern that its constitutional authority
might not be sufficient to ban instances of electronic surveillance that bore no
discernable connection to interstate commerce or any other of the enumerated
powers.  So it enacted a general prohibition, and as a safety precaution,  a second
provision more tightly tethered to specific jurisdictional factors.19  The Justice
Department has honored that caution by employing subparagraph (b) to prosecute the
interception of oral communications, while using subparagraph (a) to prosecute other
forms of electronic eavesdropping, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE CRIMINAL RESOURCE
MANUAL at 1050.
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20  The dictionary definition of “aural” is “of or relating to the ear or to the sense of hearing,”
MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 76 (10th ed. 1996).
21  S.Rep.No. 541, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1986)(the “amendment clarifies that it is illegal
to intercept the non-voice portion of a wire communication.  For example, it is illegal to
intercept the data or digitized portion of a voice communication”); see also H.REP.NO. 647,
99th Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1986).
22  “<[E]lectronic, mechanical, or other device’ means any device or apparatus which can be
used to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication other than – (a) any telephone or
telegraph instrument, equipment or facility, or any component thereof, (i) furnished to the
subscriber or user by a provider of wire or electronic communication service in the ordinary
course of its business and being used by the subscriber or user in the ordinary course of its
business or furnished by such subscriber or user for connection to the facilities of such service
and used in the ordinary course of its business; or (ii) being used by a provider of wire or
electronic communication service in the ordinary course of its business, or by an investigative
or law enforcement officer in the ordinary course of his duties; (b) a hearing aid or similar
device being used to correct subnormal hearing to not better than normal,” 18 U.S.C. 2510(5).
23  See the cases cited and commentary in Barnett & Makar, “n the Ordinary Course of
Business”: The Legal Limits of Workplace Wiretapping, 10 HASTINGS JOURNAL OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND ENTERTAINMENT LAW 715 (1988); Application to Extension
Telephones of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (18
U.S.C. §§2510 et seq.), Pertaining to Interceptions of Wire Communications, 58 ALR Fed.
594; Eavesdropping on Extension Telephone as Invasion of Privacy,  49 ALR 4th 430.
Interception
Interception “means the aural or other acquisition of the contents” of various
kinds of communications.20  ECPA enlarged the definition by adding the words “or
other acquisition” so that it is no longer limited to interceptions that can be heard.21
Endeavoring to intercept
Although the statute condemns attempted wiretapping and electronic
eavesdropping (“endeavoring to intercept”), 18 U.S.C. 2511(1), the provisions appear
to have escaped use, interest, or comment heretofore, perhaps because the conduct
most likely to constitute preparation for an interception – possession of wiretapping
equipment – is already a separate crime, 18 U.S.C. 2512, discussed, infra.
By electronic, mechanical, or other device
The statute does not cover common law “eavesdropping,” but only interceptions
“by electronic, mechanical or other device,” 18 U.S.C. 2510(4).  That phrase is in turn
defined so as not to include hearing aids or extension telephones in normal use.22
Whether an extension phone has been installed and is being used in the ordinary
course of business or in the ordinary course of law enforcement duties, so that it no
longer constitutes an interception device for purposes of Title III/ECPA and
comparable state laws has proven a somewhat vexing question.23 
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24  See e.g., Deal v. Spears, 780 F.Supp. 618, 623 (W.D.Ark. 1991), aff’d, 980 F.2d 1153
(8th Cir. 1992)(employer regularly taped employee calls by means of a device attached to an
extension phone; most of the calls were personal and recording and disclosing them served no
business purpose).
25  Adams v. Battle Creek, 250 F.3d 980, 983 (6th Cir. 2001); Arias v. Mutual Central Alarm
Service, 202 F.3d 553, 558 (2d Cir. 2000); Berry v. Funk, 146 F.3d 1003, 1008 (D.C.Cir.
1998); Sanders v. Robert Bosch Corp., 38 F.3d 736, 741 (4th Cir. 1994).
Some courts include surreptitious, extension phone interceptions conducted within the
family home as part of the “business extension” exception, Anonymous v. Anonymous, 558
F.2d 677, 678-79 (2d Cir. 1977); Scheib v. Grant, 22 F.3d 149, 154 (7th Cir. 1994);
Newcomb v. Ingle, 944 F.2d 1534, 1536 (10th Cir. 1991); contra, United States v. Murdock,
63 F.3d 1391, 1400 (6th Cir. 1995).
26  See e.g., Smith v. U.S.Dept. of Justice, 251 F.3d 1647, 1049-50 (D.C.Cir. 2001); United
States v. Poyck, 77 F.3d 285, 292 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Daniels, 902 F.2d 1238,
1245 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Paul, 614 F.2d 115, 117 (6th Cir. 1980).
27  Amati v. Woodstock, 176 F.3d 952, 955 (7th Cir. 1999)(“Investigation is within the
ordinary course of law enforcement, so if <ordinary’ were read literally warrants would rarely
if ever be required for electronic eavesdropping, which was surely not Congress’s intent.
Since the purpose of the statute was primarily to regulate the use of wiretapping and other
electronic surveillance for investigatory purposes, <ordinary’ should not be read so broadly;
it is more reasonably interpreted to refer to routine noninvestigative recording of telephone
conversations”).
28  The exception, however, does not permit a county to record all calls in and out of the
offices of county judges merely because a detention center and the judges share a common
facility, Abraham v. Greenville, 237 F.3d 386, 390 (4th Cir. 2001), nor does it permit
jailhouse telephone monitoring of an inmate’s confession to a clergyman, Mockaitis v.
Harcleroad, 104 F.3d 1522, 1530 (9th Cir. 1997).
Although often intertwined with the consent exception discussed below, the
question generally turns on the facts in a given case.24  When the exemption is claimed
as a practice in the ordinary course of business, the interception must be for a
legitimate business reason, it must be routinely conducted, and at least in some
circuits employees must be notified at that their conversations are being monitored.25
Similarly, “Congress most likely carved out an exception for law enforcement officials
to make clear that the routine and almost universal recording of phone lines by police
departments and prisons, as well as other law enforcement institutions, is exempt from
the statute,” Adams v. Battle Creek, 250 F.3d at 984.26  The exception contemplates
administrative rather than investigative monitoring,27 which must nevertheless be
justified by a lawful, valid law enforcement concern.28
Wire, oral or electronic communications
An interception can only be a violation of ECPA if the conversation or other
form of communication intercepted is among those kinds which the statute protects,
in over simplified terms – telephone (wire), face to face (oral), and computer
(electronic).  Congress used the definitions of the three forms of communications to
describe the communications beyond the Act’s reach as well as those within its grasp.
For example, “oral communication” by definition includes only those face to face
conversations with respect to which the speakers have a justifiable expectation of
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29  “<[O]ral communication’ means any oral communication uttered by a person exhibiting an
expectation that such communication is not subject to interception under circumstances
justifying such expectation, but such term does not include any electronic communication,”
2510(2).
30  “<[W]ire communication’ means any aural transfer made in whole or in part through the
use of facilities for the transmission of communications by the aid of wire, cable, or other like
connection between the point of origin and the point of reception (including the use of such
connection in a switching station) furnished or operated by any person engaged in providing
or operating such facilities for the transmission of interstate or foreign communications or
communications affecting interstate or foreign commerce and such term includes any
electronic storage of such communication,” 18 U.S.C. 2510(1).
31 “<[E]lectronic communication’ means any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds,
data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio,
electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical system that affects interstate or foreign
commerce, but does not include – (A) the radio portion of a cordless telephone communication
that is transmitted between the cordless handset and the base unit; (B) any wire or oral
communication; (C) any communication made through a tone-only paging device; or (D) any
communication from a tracking device (as defined in section 3117 of this title),” 18 U.S.C.
2510(12).
32  On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427
(1963); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
33  United States v. White, 401 U.S. at 751 (1971)(“Concededly a police agent who conceals
his police connections may write down for official use his conversations with a defendant and
testify concerning them, without a warrant authorizing his encounters with the defendant and
without otherwise violating the latter’s Fourth Amendment rights . . . . For constitutional
purposes, no different result is required if the agent instead of immediately reporting and
transcribing his conversations with defendant, either (1) simultaneously records them with
electronic equipment which he is carrying on his person, Lopez v. United States, supra; (2)
(continued...)
privacy.29  Similarly, “wire communications” are limited to those that are at some
point involve voice communications (i.e. only aural transfers). 30  Radio and data
transmissions are generally “electronic communications.”  The definition includes
other forms of information transfer but excludes certain radio transmissions which can
be innocently captured without great difficulty.31  Although it is not a federal crime
to intercept radio communications under any number of conditions, the exclusion is
not a matter of definition but of special general exemptions, 18 U.S.C. 2511(2)(g),
discussed below.
Exemptions: consent interceptions
Consent interceptions are common, controversial and have a history all their
own.  The early bans on divulging telegraph or telephone messages had a consent
exception  The Supreme Court upheld consent interceptions against Fourth
Amendment challenge both before and after the enactment of Title III.32  The
argument in favor of consent interceptions has always been essentially that a speaker
risks the indiscretion of his listeners and holds no superior legal position simply
because a listener elects to record or transmit his statements rather than subsequently
memorializing or repeating them.33
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or carries radio equipment which simultaneously transmits the conversations either to
recording equipment located elsewhere or to other agents monitoring the transmitting
frequency.  On Lee v. United States, supra.  If the conduct and revelations of an agent
operating without electronic equipment do not invade the defendant’s constitutionally
justifiable expectations of privacy, neither does a simultaneous recording of the same
conversations made by the agent or by others from transmissions received from the agent to
whom the defendant is talking and whose trustworthiness the defendant necessarily risks”);
Lopez v. United States 373 U.S. 427, 439 (1963)(“Stripped to its essentials, petitioner’s
argument amounts to saying that he has a constitutional right to rely on possible flaws in the
agent’s memory, or to challenge the agent’s credibility without being beset by corroborating
evidence that is not susceptible of impeachment.  For no other argument can justify excluding
an accurate version of a conversation that the agent could testify to from memory.  We think
the risk that petitioner took in offering a bribe to Davis fairly included the risk that the offer
would be accurately reproduced in court, whether by faultless memory or mechanical
recording”).
34  “(c) It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person acting under color of law to
intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication, where such person is a party to the
communication or one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such
interception.
“(d) It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person not acting under color of law
to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication where such person is a party to the
communication or where one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to
such interception unless such communication is intercepted for the purpose of committing any
criminal or tortious act in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any
State,” 18 U.S.C. 2511(2)(c),(d).
35  For citations to state law see Appendix II.
36  United States v. Footman, 215 F.3d 145, 154-55 (1st Cir. 2000) (inmate use of prison
phone); Griggs-Ryan v. Smith, 904 F.2d 112, 116-17 (1st Cir. 1990)(use of landlady’s
phone).
37  Anthony v. United States, 667 F.2d 870, 876 (10th Cir. 1981).
38  United States v. Antoon, 933 F.2d 200, 203-204 (3d Cir. 1991), but see, O’Ferrell v.
(continued...)
Wiretapping or electronic eavesdropping by either the police or anyone else with the
consent of at least one party to the conversation is not unlawful under the federal
statute.34  These provisions do no more than shield consent interceptions from the
sanctions of federal law; they afford no protection from the sanctions of state law.
Many of the states recognize comparable exceptions, but some only permit
interception with the consent of all parties to a communication.35
Under federal law, consent may be either explicitly or implicitly given.  For
instance, someone who uses a telephone other than his or her own and has been told
by the subscriber that conversations over the instrument are recorded has been held
to have implicitly consented to interception when using the instrument.36  This is not
to say that subscriber consent alone is sufficient, for it is the parties to the
conversation whose privacy is designed to protect.37 Although consent may be given
in the hopes of leniency from law enforcement officials or as an election between
unpalatable alternatives, it must be freely given and not secured coercively.38 
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United States, 968 F.Supp. 1519, 1541 (M.D.Ala. 1997)(an individual – who spoke to his
wife on the telephone after being told by FBI agents, then executing a search warrant at his
place of business, that he could only speak to her with the agents listening in – consented to
the interception, even if FBI’s initial search were unconstitutional).
39  “(g) It shall not be unlawful under this chapter or chapter 121 of this title for any person
– (i) to intercept or access an electronic communication made through an electronic
communication system that is configured so that such electronic communication is readily
accessible to the general public;
“(ii) to intercept any radio communication which is transmitted – (I) by any station for
the use of the general public, or that relates to ships, aircraft, vehicles, or persons in distress;
(II) by any governmental, law enforcement, civil defense, private land mobile, or public safety
communications system, including police and fire, readily accessible to the general public;
(III) by a station operating on an authorized frequency within the bands allocated to the
amateur, citizens band, or general mobile radio services; or (IV) by any marine or aeronautical
communications system;by any marine or aeronautical communications system;
“(iii) to engage in any conduct which – (I) is prohibited by section 633 of the
Communications Act of 1934; or (II) is excepted from the application of section 705(a) of the
Communications Act of 1934 by section 705(b) of that Act;
“(iv) to intercept any wire or electronic communication the transmission of which is
causing harmful interference to any lawfully operating station or consumer electronic
equipment, to the extent necessary to identify the source of such interference; or
“(v) for other users of the same frequency to intercept any radio communication made
through a system that utilizes frequencies monitored by individuals engaged in the provision
or the use of such system, if such communication is not scrambled or encrypted,” 18 U.S.C.
2511(2)(g).
Private consent interceptions may not be conducted for a criminal or tortious
purpose.  At one time, the limitation encompassed interceptions for criminal, tortious,
or otherwise injurious purposes, but ECPA dropped the reference to injurious
purposes for fear that first amendment values might be threatened should the clause
be read to outlaw consent interceptions conducted to embarrass, S.REP.NO. 541, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. 17-8 (1986); H.REP.NO. 647, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 39-40 (1986). 
Exemptions: publicly accessible radio communications
Radio communications which can be inadvertently heard or are intended to be
heard by the public are likewise exempt.  These include not only commercial
broadcasts, but ship and aircraft distress signals, tone-only pagers, marine radio and
citizen band radio transmissions, and interceptions necessary to identify the source any
transmission, radio or otherwise, disrupting communications satellite broadcasts.39
Exemptions: government officials
Government officials enjoy an exemption when acting under judicial authority,
whether that provided in Title III/ECPA for federal and state law enforcement
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40  “Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter any person who  (a)
intentionally intercepts . . . .” 18 U.S.C. 2511(1)(emphasis added).
41  “(e) Notwithstanding any other provision of this title or section 705 or 706 of the
Communications Act of 1934, it shall not be unlawful for an officer, employee, or agent of
the United States in the normal course of his official duty to conduct electronic surveillance,
as defined in section 101 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as authorized
by that Act,”18 U.S.C. 2511(2)(e).
42  “(h) It shall not be unlawful under this chapter – (i) to use a pen register or a trap and trace
device (as those terms are defined for the purpose of chapter 206). . . .” 18 U.S.C. 2511(2)(h).
For the citations to state statutes permitting judicial authorization of law enforcement
interception of wire, oral or electronic communications, for access to stored electronic
communications, and for the use pen registers and trap and trace devices see Appendix V.
43  “(a)(i) It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for an operator of a switchboard, or on
officer, employee, or agent of a provider of wire or electronic communication service, whose
facilities are used in the transmission of a wire or electronic communication, to intercept,
disclose, or use that communication in the normal course of his employment while engaged
in any activity which is a necessary incident to the rendition of his service or to the protection
of the rights or property of the provider of that service, except that a provider of wire
communication service to the public shall not utilize service observing or random monitoring
except for mechanical or service quality control checks . . .
*     *     *
“(h) It shall not be unlawful under this chapter . . .
“(ii) for a provider of electronic communication service to record the fact that a wire or
electronic communication was initiated or completed in order to protect such provider, another
provider furnishing service toward the completion of the wire or electronic communication,
or a user of that service, from fraudulent, unlawful or abusive use of such service,” 18 U.S.C.
2511(2)(a)(i),(h).
officers,40 the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act,41 or the separate provisions
according them access to stored electronic communications and the use of pen
registers and trap and trace devices.42 
Exemptions: communication service providers
There is a general exemption for those associated with supplying
communications services, the telephone company, switchboard operators, and the
like.  The exemption not only permits improved service and lets the telephone
company protect itself against fraud,43 but it allows for assistance to federal and state
CRS-16
44  “(ii) Notwithstanding any other law, providers of wire or electronic communication service,
their officers, employees, and agents, landlords, custodians, or other persons, are authorized
to provide information, facilities, or technical assistance to persons authorized by law to
intercept wire, oral, or electronic communications or to conduct electronic surveillance, as
defined in section 101 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, if such provider,
its officers, employees, or agents, landlord, custodian, or  other specified person, has been
provided with – 
(A) a court order directing such assistance signed by the authorizing judge, or 
(B) a certification in writing by a person specified in section 2518(7) of this title or the
Attorney General of the United States that no warrant or court order is required by law,
that all statutory requirements have been met, and that the specified assistance is
required,
setting forth the period of time during which the provision of the information, facilities, or
technical assistance is authorized and specifying the information, facilities, or technical
assistance required.  No provider of wire or electronic communication service, officer,
employee, or agent thereof, or landlord, custodian, or other specified person shall disclose the
existence of any interception or surveillance or the device used to accomplish the interception
or surveillance with respect to which the person has been furnished a court order or
certification under this chapter, except as may otherwise be required by legal process and then
only after prior notification to the Attorney General or to the principal prosecuting attorney
of a State or any political subdivision of a State, as may be appropriate.  Any such disclosure,
shall render such person liable for the civil damages provided for in section 2520.  No cause
of action shall lie in any court against any provider of wire or electronic communication
service, its officers, employees, or agents, landlord, custodian, or other specified person for
providing information, facilities, or assistance in accordance with the terms of a court order
or certification under this chapter,” 18 U.S.C. 2511(2)(a)(ii).
45 “(b) It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for an officer, employee, or agent of the
Federal Communications Commission, in the normal course of his employment and in
discharge of the monitoring responsibilities exercised by the Commission in the enforcement
of chapter 5 of title 47 of the United States Code, to intercept a wire or electronic
communication, or oral communication transmitted by radio, or to disclose or use the
information thereby obtained,” 18 U.S.C. 2511(2)(b).
46  Pollock v. Pollock, 154 F.3d 601, 611 (8th Cir. 1998); Wagner v. Wagner, 64 F.Supp.2d
895, 889-901 (D.Minn. 1999); Campbell v. Price, 2 F.Supp.2d 1186, 1191-192 (E.D.Ark.
1998); Thompson v. Dulaney, 838 F.Supp. 1535 (D.Utah 1993).
47  Heggy v. Heggy, 944 F.2d 1537, 1539 (10th Cir. 1991); Kempf v. Kempf, 868 F.2d 970,
972 (8th Cir. 1989); Pritchard v. Pritchard, 732 F.2d 372, 374 (4th Cir. 1984); United States
v. Jones, 542 F.2d 661, 667 (6th Cir. 1976); Kratz v. Kratz, 477 F.Supp. 463, 467-70
(E.D.Pa. 1979); Heyman v. Heyman, 548 F.Supp. 1041, 1045-47 (N.D.Ill. 1982).
officials operating under a judicially supervised interception order,44 and for the
regulatory activities of the Federal Communications Commission.45
Domestic exemptions
A few courts recognize a “vicarious consent” exception under which a custodial
parent may secretly record the conversations of his or her minor child in the interest
of protecting the child.46  Although rejected by most,47 a handful of federal courts
have held that Title III/ECPA does not preclude one spouse from wiretapping or
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48  Simpson v. Simpson, 490 F.2d 803, 809 (5th Cir. 1974); Perfit v. Perfit, 693 F.Supp. 854-
56 (C.D.Cal. 1988); see generally, Applicability, in Civil Action, of Provisions of Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 Prohibiting Interception of Communications (18
USCS §2511(1)), to Interception by Spouse, or Spouse’s Agent, of Conversations of Other
Spouse, 139 ALR FED. 517, and the cases discussed therein.
49  Anonymous v. Anonymous, 558 F.2d 677, 678-79 (2d Cir. 1977); Scheib v. Grant, 22 F.3d
149, 154 (7th Cir. 1994); Newcomb v. Ingle, 944 F.2d 1534, 1536 (10th Cir. 1991); contra,
United States v. Murdock, 63 F.3d 1391, 1400 (6th Cir. 1995).
50  “Except as provided in (b) of this subsection or in subsection (5), whoever violates
subsection (1) of this section shall be fined under this title* or imprisoned not more than five
years, or both.” 18 U.S.C. 2511(4)(a).
* Section 3559 of title 18 classifies as a felony any offense punishable by imprisonment
for more than one year; and as a class A misdemeanor any offense punishable by
imprisonment for one year or less but not more than six months.  Unless Congress clearly
rejects the general fine ceilings it provides, section 3571 of title 18 sets the fines for felonies
at not more than $250,000 for individuals and not more than $500,000 for organizations, and
for class A misdemeanors at not more than $100,000 for individuals and not more than
$200,000 for organizations.  If there is monetary loss or gain associated with the offense, the
offender may alternatively be fined not more than twice the amount of the loss or gain, 18
U.S.C. 3571.
51 “(b) If the offense is a first offense under paragraph (a) of this subsection and is not for a
tortious or illegal purpose or for purposes of direct or indirect commercial advantage or
private commercial gain, and the wire or electronic communication with respect to which the
offense under paragraph (a) is a radio communication that is not scrambled or encrypted, then
(continued...)
electronically eavesdropping upon the other,48 a result other courts have sometimes
reached through the telephone extension exception discussed above.49
Consequences: Criminal Penalties
Interceptions in violation of Title III/ECPA are generally punishable by
imprisonment for not more than five years and/or a fine of not more than $250,000
for individuals and not more than $500,000 for organizations.50  Victims are entitled
to equitable relief; reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs; damages in an amount equal
to the greater of $10,000, $100 per day for each day of a violation, or the value of
damage or gain attributable to the violation; and in appropriate cases, punitive
damages, 18 U.S.C. 2520.
Congress decided to mitigate punishment for two types of offenders. In order to
minimize the opprobrium directed at radio scanner enthusiasts, use of a scanner or
similar device to capture the radio portion of a message from a cellular phone, car
phone or voice message pager is punishable by no more than a fine of not more than
$500.  Intentionally intercepting the non-radio portion of the same conversation is
punishable by imprisonment for not more than a year and/or a fine of not more than
$100,000.  Subsequent offenses, interceptions committed for criminal or tortious
purposes or motivated by commercial advantage or gain, and the capture of scrambled
or encrypted conversations all carry the more stringent, basic penalty, imprisonment
for not more than five years and/or a fine of not more than $250,000.51
CRS-18
51(...continued)
– radio communication that is not scrambled or encrypted, then –(i) if the communication is
not the radio portion of a cellular telephone communication, a public land mobile radio service
communication or a paging service communication, and the conduct is not that described in
subsection (5), the offender shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one
year, or both; and (ii) if the communication is the radio portion of a cellular telephone
communication, a public land mobile radio service communication or a paging service
communication, the offender shall be fined not more than $500,” 18 U.S.C. 2511(4)(b).
52  “(c) Conduct otherwise an offense under this subsection that consists of or relates to the
interception of a satellite transmission that is not encrypted or scrambled and that is
transmitted – (i) to a broadcasting station for purposes of retransmission to the general public;
or (ii) as an audio subcarrier intended for redistribution to facilities open to the public, but not
including data transmissions or telephone calls,  is not an offense under this subsection unless
the conduct is for the purpose of direct or indirect commercial advantage or private financial
gain,” 18 U.S.C. 2511(4)(c).
53 “(5)(a)(i) If the communication is – (A) a private satellite video communication that is not
scrambled or encrypted and the conduct in violation of this chapter is the private viewing of
that communication and is not for a tortious or illegal purpose or for purposes of direct or
indirect commercial advantage or private commercial gain; or (B) a radio communication that
is transmitted on frequencies allocated under subpart D of part 74 of the rules of the Federal
Communications Commission that is not scrambled or encrypted and the conduct in violation
of this chapter is not for tortious or illegal purpose or for purposes of direct or indirect
commercial advantage or private commercial gain, then the person who engages in such
conduct shall be subject to suit by the Federal Government in a court of competent
jurisdiction.  (ii) In an action under this subsection – (A) if the violation of this chapter is a
first offense for the person under paragraph (a) of subsection (4) and such person has not been
found liable in a civil action under section 2520 of this title, the Federal Government shall be
entitled to appropriate injunctive relief; and (B) if the violation of this chapter is a second or
subsequent offense under paragraph (a) of subsection (4) or such person has been found liable
in any prior civil action under section 2520, the person shall be subject to a mandatory $500
civil fine.
“(b) The court may use any means within its authority to enforce an injunction issued
under paragraph (ii)(A), and shall impose a civil fine of not less than $500 for each violation
of such an injunction.” 18 U.S.C. 2511(5).
Under 18 U.S.C. 2520, victims may recover no more than damages of not less than $50
nor more than $500 for the first offense, increased to $100 and $1000 for subsequent offenses.
54  “A good faith reliance on – (1) a court warrant or order, a grand jury subpoena, a
legislative authorization, or a statutory authorization; (2) a request of an investigative or law
enforcement officer under section 2518(7) of this title; or (3) a good faith determination that
section 2511(3)* of this title permitted the conduct complained of; is a complete defense
(continued...)
Filching satellite communications is the second instance where Congress opted
for reduced penalties.  Unauthorized interception is broadly proscribed subject to an
exception for unscrambled transmissions,52 but interceptions for neither criminal,
tortious, nor mercenary purposes, subject offenders to only civil liability.53 
The statutory good faith defense created as part of the civil cause of action in 18
U.S.C. 2520 is available as a defense against both civil and criminal charges.54   As
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against any civil or criminal action brought under this chapter or any other law,” 18 U.S.C.
2520(d).
*”(3)(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this subsection, a person or entity
providing an electronic communication service to the public shall not intentionally divulge the
contents of any communication (other than one to such person or entity, or an agent thereof)
while in transmission on that service to any person or entity other than an addressee or
intended recipient of such communication or an agent of such addressee or intended recipient.
“(b) A person or entity providing electronic communication service to the public may
divulge the contents of any such communication – (i) as otherwise authorized in section
2511(2)(a) or 2517 of this title; (ii) with the lawful consent of the originator or any addressee
or intended recipient of such communication; (iii) to a person employed or authorized, or
whose facilities are used, to forward such communication to its destination; or (iv) which were
inadvertently obtained by the service provider and which appear to pertain to the commission
of a crime, if such divulgence is made to a law enforcement agency,” 18 U.S.C. 2511(3).
55  The $10,000 lump sum for liquidated damages is limited to a single award per victim rather
than permitting $10,000 multiples based on the number of violations or the number of types
of violations, as long as the violations are “interrelated and time compacted,” Smoot v. United
Transportation Union, 246 F.3d 633, 642-645 (6th Cir. 2001); Desilets v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., 171 F.3d 711, 713 (1st Cir. 1999).
56  Compare, Nalley v. Nalley, 53 F.3d 649, 651-53 (4th Cir. 1995), Reynolds v. Spears, 93
F.3d 428, 433 (8th Cir. 1996); Romano v. Terkik, 939 F.Supp. 144, 146-47 (D.Conn.
1996)(courts have discretion), with, Rodgers v. Wood, 910 F.2d 444, 447-49 (7th Cir. 1990)
and Menda Biton v. Menda, 812 F.Supp. 283, 284 (D. Puerto Rico 1993)(courts have no
such discretion)(note that after Menda, the First Circuit in Desilets v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
171 F.3d at 716-17 treated as a matter for the trial court’s discretion the question of whether
the award of plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees should be reduced when punitive damages have been
denied).
57  Adams v. Battle Creek, 250 F.3d 980, 984 (6th Cir. 2001); Organizacion JD Ltda. v.
United States Department of Justice, 18 F.3d 91, 94-5 (2d Cir. 1994); Connor v. Tate, 120
F.Supp.2d 1370, 1374 (N.D.Ga. 2001); Dorris v. Absher, 959 F.Supp. 813, 820 (M.D.Tenn.
1997), aff’d/rev’d in part on other grounds, 179 F.3d 420 (6th Cir. 1999); PBA Local No.
38 v. Woodbridge Police Department, 832 F.Supp. 808, 822-23 (D.N.J. 1993)(each
concluding that governmental entities may be held liable); contra, Abbott v. Winthrop
Harbor, 205 F.3d 976, 980 (7th Cir. 2000); Amati v. Woodstock, 176 F.3d 952, 956 (7th Cir.
1999).
noted below, the defense seems to lack sufficient breadth to shelter any offender other
than a government official or some one working at their direction.
Consequences: Civil Liability
Victims of illegal wiretapping or electronic eavesdropping may be entitled
equitable relief, damages (equal to the greater of actual damages, $100 per day of
violation, or $10,000),55  punitive damages, reasonable attorney’s fees and reasonable
litigation costs, 18 U.S.C. 2520.  There is a division of authority as to whether (1) a
court may decline to award damages, attorneys’ fees and costs once a violation has
been shown,56 (2) governmental entities are liable for violations of section 2520,57 and
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58  Compare, Berry v. Funk, 146 F.3d 1003, 1013 (D.C.Cir. 1998)(no immunity), with,
Tapley v. Collins, 211 F.3d 1210, 1216 (11th Cir. 2000)(immunity); Blake v. Wright, 179
F.3d 1003, 1011-13(6th Cir. 1999)(same).
59  Williams v. Poulos, 11 F.3d 271, 285 (1st Cir. 1993); United States v. Wuliger, 981 F.2d
1497, 1507 (6th Cir. 1992).
60  The commentary in this part relies heavily on an earlier report entitled, Wiretapping, Tape
Recorders & Legal Ethics: Questions Posed by Attorney Involvement in Secretly Recording
Conversation, CRS REP. No.98-250 (1998).
61Ala. Opinion 84-22 (1984); People v. Smith, 778 P.2d 685, 686, 687 (Colo. 1989); Haw.
Formal Opinion No. 30 (1988); Ind.State Bar Ass’n Op.No.1 (2000); Iowa State Bar Ass’n
v. Mollman, 488 N.W.2d 168, 169-70, 171-72 (Iowa 1992); Mo.Advisory Comm. Op. Misc.
30 (1978); Tex.Stat.Bar Op. 514 (1996); Va. LEO #1635 (1995), Va. LEO #1324; Gunter
v. Virginia State Bar, 238 Va. 617, 621-22, 385 S.E.2d 597, 600 (1989).
Thus far, the federal courts seem to be in accord, Parrott v. Wilson, 707 F.2d 1262
(11th Cir. 1983); Moody v. IRS, 654 F.2d 795 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Ward v. Maritz, Inc., 156
F.R.D. 592 (D.N.J. 1994); Wilson v. Lamb, 125 F.R.D. 142 (E.D.Ky. 1989); Haigh V.
Matsushita Electric Corp., 676 F.Supp. 1332 (E.D.Va. 1987).
62  Ariz. Opinion No. 95-03 (1995); Alaska Bar Ass’n Eth.Comm. Ethics Opinions No. 95-5
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(3) law enforcement officers enjoy a qualified immunity from suit under section
2520.58
The cause of action created in section 2520 is subject to a good faith defense,
18 U.S.C. 2520(d)(quote in note 52, supra.)  The only apparent efforts to claim the
defense by any one other than a government official or some one working at their
direction have been unsuccessful.59 
Consequences: Attorney Discipline60
Surreptitiously recording telephone or face to face conversations without the
consent of at least one party to the conversation is illegal and contrary to the ethical
standards of the legal profession.  In some states recording such conversations
requires the consent of all parties to the conversation.  Elsewhere, recording a
conversation with the knowledge or consent of only one participant may be lawful but
unethical.
The American Bar Association (ABA) concluded almost a quarter of a century
ago that secretly recording a conversation without the knowledge or consent of all of
the participants violated the ethical prohibition against engaging in conduct involving
“dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.”  The ABA conceded, however, that
law enforcement recording, conducted under judicial supervision, breached no ethical
standard.
The opinions of the authorities responsible for regulation of the practice of law
in the various states fall into three categories.  Some agree with the ABA.61  Some
agree with the ABA but have expanded the circumstances under which recording may
be conducted within ethical bounds.62  Some reject the ABA view.63 
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(1995) and No. 91-4 (1991); Idaho Formal Opinion 130 (1989); Kan.Bar.Ass’n Opinion 96-
9 (1997); Ky.Opinion E-279 (1984); Minn.Law.Prof. Resp.Bd. Opinion No. 18 (1996); Ohio
Bd.Com.Griev.Disp. Opinion No. 97-3 (1997); S.C. Ethics Advisory Opinion 92-17 (1992);
Tenn.Bd.Prof.Resp. Formal Ethics Opinion No. 86-F-14(a) (1986).
63  D.C. Opinion No. 229 (1992) (recording was not unethical because it occurred under
circumstances in which the uninformed party should have anticipated that the conversation
would be recorded or otherwise memorialized);  Mississippi Bar v. Attorney ST., 621 So.2d
229 (Miss. 1993)(context of the circumstances test); Conn.Bar Ass’‘n Op. 98-9
(1998)(same); Mich.State Bar Op. RI-309 (1998)(same); Me.State Bar Op.No. 168
(1999)(same); N.M.Opinion 1996-2 (1996)(members of the bar are advised that there are no
clear guidelines and that the prudent attorney avoids surreptitious recording); N.C. RPC 171
(1994)(lawyers are encouraged to disclose to the other lawyer that a conversation is being tape
recorded); Okla.Bar Ass’n Opinion 307 (1994)(a lawyer may secretly recording his or her
conversations without the knowledge or consent of other parties to the conversation unless the
recording is unlawful or in violation of some ethical standard involving more than simply
recording); Ore.State Bar Ass’n Formal Opinion No. 1991-74 (1991) (an attorney with one
party consent he or she may record a telephone conversation “in absence of conduct which
would reasonably lead an individual to believe that no recording would be made”); Utah State
Bar Ethics Advisory Opinion No. 96-04 (1996) (“recording conversations to which an
attorney is a party without prior disclosure to the other parties is not unethical when the act,
considered within the context of the circumstances, does not involve dishonesty, fraud, deceit
or misrepresentation”); Wis.Opinion E-94-5 (“whether the secret recording of a telephone
conversation by a lawyer involves <dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation’ under SCR
20:8.4(c) depends upon all the circumstances operating at the time”).  In New York, the
question of whether an attorney’s surreptitiously recording conversations is ethically suspect
is determined by locality, compare, Ass’n of the Bar of City of N.Y. Formal Opinion No.
1995-10 (1995)(secret recording is per se unethical), with, N.Y.County Lawyer’s Ass’n
Opinion No. 696 (1993)(secret recording is not per se unethical).
64 “Whenever any wire or oral communication has been intercepted, no part of the contents
of such communication and no evidence derived therefrom may be received in evidence in any
trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court, grand jury, department, officer,
agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority of the United States, a State,
or a political subdivision thereof if the disclosure of that information would be in violation of
this chapter,” 18 U.S.C. 2515.
65 “Any aggrieved person in any trial, hearing, or proceeding in or before any court,
department, officer, agency, regulatory body, or other authority of the United States, a State,
or a political subdivision thereof, may move to suppress the contents of any wire or oral
communication intercepted pursuant to this chapter, or evidence derived therefrom, on the
grounds that – (i) the communication was unlawfully intercepted; (ii) the order of
authorization or approval under which it was intercepted is insufficient on its face; or (iii) the
interception was not made in conformity with the order of authorization or approval.
“Such motion shall be made before the trial, hearing, or proceeding unless there was no
(continued...)
Consequences: Exclusion of evidence
Information whose disclosure is prohibited by the federal wiretapping statute is
inadmissible as evidence before any federal, state, or local tribunal or authority, 18
U.S.C. 2515.64  The benefits of the section 2515 exclusionary rule may be claimed
through a motion to suppress under 18 U.S.C. 2518(10)(a).65 
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opportunity to make such motion or the person was not aware of the grounds of the motion.
If the motion is granted, the contents of the intercepted wire or oral communication, or
evidence derived therefrom, shall be treated as having been obtained in violation of this
chapter.  The judge, upon the filing of such motion by the aggrieved person, may in his
discretion make available to the aggrieved person or his counsel for inspection such portions
of the intercepted communication or evidence derived therefrom as the judge determines to be
in the interests of justice,” 18 U.S.C. 2518(10)(a).
“The Supreme Court has explained the relationship between these two provisions.  In
United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505 (1974), the Court wrote that <what disclosures are
forbidden under 2515 and we subject to motions to suppress is . . . governed by 2518(10(a).’
Thus, evidence may be suppressed only if one of the grounds set out in 2518(10)(a) is met.
Moreover not every failure to comply fully with any requirement provided in Title III would
render the interception of wire or oral communications unlawful under 2518(10)(a)(i). United
States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413, 433 (1977), quoting United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562
(1974).  Rather suppression is mandated only for a failure to satisfy any of those statutory
requirements that directly and substantially implement the congressional intention to limit the
use of intercept procedures to those situations clearly calling for the employment of this
extraordinary investigative device, Donovan, 429 U.S. at 433-34, quoting Girodano, 416
U.S. at 527,” United States v. Williams, 124 F.3d 411, 426 (3d Cir. 1997); United States v.
Escobar-deJesus, 187 F.3d 148, 171 (1st Cir. 1999).
66 See also, United States v. Ambrosio, 898 F.Supp. 177, 187 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); United States
v. Malelzadeh, 855 F.2d 1492, 1497 (11th Cir. 1988), contra, United State v. McGinness,
764 F.Supp. 888, 897 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
Gelbard held that a grand jury witness might claim the protection of section 2515
through a refusal to answer questions based upon an unlawful wiretap notwithstanding the
fact that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule does not apply in grand jury proceedings.
The good faith exception to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule permits the admission
of evidence secured in violation of the Fourth Amendment, if the officers responsible for the
breach were acting in good faith reliance upon the apparent authority of a search warrant or
some like condition negating the remedial force of the rule, United States v. Leon, 468 U.S.
431, 446-48 (1984).
67  Culbertson v. Culbertson, 143 F.3d 825, 827-28 (4th Cir. 1998); Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d
1527, 1547 (6th Cir. 1994). United States v. Echavarria-Olarte, 904 F.2d 1391 (9th Cir.
1990); United States v. Vest, 813 F.2d 477, 484 (1st Cir. 1987); Anthony v. United States,
667 F.2d 870 (10th Cir. 1981).
Although the Supreme Court has held that section 2515 may require suppression
in instances where the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule would not, Gelbard v.
United States, 408 U.S. 41, 52 (1972), some of the lower courts have recognized the
applicability of the good faith exception to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule
in section 2515 cases, United States v. Moore, 41 F.3d 370, 376 (8th Cir. 1994).66
Other courts have held, moreover, that the fruits of an unlawful wiretapping or
electronic eavesdropping may be used for impeachment purposes.67 
The admissibility of tapes or transcripts of tapes of intercepted conversations
raise a number of questions quite apart from the legality of the interception.  As a
consequence of the prerequisites required for admission, privately recorded
conversations are more likely to be found inadmissible than those recorded by
government officials. Admissibility will require the party moving admission to show
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68  United States v. Thompson, 130 F.3d 676, 683 (5th Cir. 1997); United States v. Panaro,
241 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. Smith, 242 F.3d 737, 741 (7th Cir.
2001).
69  United States v. Webster, 84 F.3d 1056, 1064 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Green, 175
F.3d 822, 830 n.3 (10th Cir. 1999); cf., United States v. Calderin-Rodriguez, 244 F.3d 977,
986-87 (8th Cir. 2001).  These seven factors have been fairly widely cited since they were first
announced in United States v. McKeever, 169 F.Supp 426, 430 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), rev’d on
other grounds, 271 F.2d 669 (2d Cir. 1959).  They are a bit formalistic for some courts who
endorse a more ad hoc approach to the assessment of whether the admission of what purports
to be a taped conversation will introduce fraud or confusion into the court, see e.g., Stringel
v. Methodist Hosp. of Indiana, Inc., 89 F.3d 415, 420 (7th Cir. 1996)(McKeever “sets out
a rather formal, seven step checklist for the authentication of tape recordings, and we have
looked to some of the features [in the past]”); United States v. White, 116 F.3d 903, 921
(D.C.Cir. 1997)(“tapes may be authenticated by testimony describing the process or system
that created the tape or by testimony from parties to the conversation affirming that the tapes
contained an accurate record of what was said”); United States v. Tropeano, 252 F.3d 653,
661 (2d Cir. 2001)(“[T]his Circuit has never expressly adopted a rigid standard for
determining the admissibility of tape recordings”).
that the tapes or transcripts are accurate, authentic and trustworthy.68  For some
courts this demands a showing that, “(1) the recording device was capable of
recording the events offered in evidence; (2) the operator was competent to operate
the device; (3) the recording is authentic and correct; (4) changes, additions, or
deletions have not been made in the recording; (5) the recording has been preserved
in a manner that is shown to the court; (6) the speakers on the tape are identified; and
(7) the conversation elicited was made voluntarily and in good faith, without any kind
of inducement.”69
Illegal Disclosure of Information Obtained by 
Wiretapping or Electronic Eavesdropping
Although often overlooked, it also a federal crime to disclose or use information
obtained from illicit wiretapping or electronic eavesdropping, 18 U.S.C. 2511(1)(c):
• any person [who]
• intentionally
• discloses or endeavors to disclose to another person
• the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication
• having reason to know
• that the information was obtained through the interception of a wire, oral, or
electronic communication
• in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2511(1)
• is subject to the same sanctions and remedies as the wiretapper or electronic
eavesdropper. 
This is true of the wiretapper or electronic eavesdropper and of all those who
disclose information, that in fact can be traced to a disclosure by the original
wiretapper or eavesdropper, with reason to know of the information’s illicit origins,
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70 Bartnicki v. Vopper, 121 S.Ct. 1753, 1756 (2001), pointed out that the First Amendment
right to free speech bars the application of section 2511(1)(c) to the disclosure of illegally
intercepted, but lawfully acquired, communications dealing with a matter of unusual public
concern. Bartnicki was a union negotiator  whose telephone conversations with the union’s
president were surreptitiously intercepted and recorded while they were discussion negotiation
of a teachers’ contract.  During the conversation, the possibility of using violence against
school board members was mentioned.  After the teachers’ contract was signed, the unknown
wiretapper secretly supplied Yocum, a critic of the union’s position, with a copy of the tape.
Yocum in turn played it for members of the school board and turned it over to Vopper, a radio
talk show host, who played it on his show.  Other stations and media outlets published the
contents as well. Bartnicki sued Vopper and Yocum for use and disclosure in violation of
sections 2511(1)(c) and 2511(1)(d).  Vopper and Yocum offered a free speech defense which
the Supreme Court accepted.  For a more extensive examination of Bartnicki, see,
Featherstone, The Right to Publish Lawfully Obtained But Illegally Intercepted Material of
Public Concern: Bartnicki v. Vopper, CRS Report RS20974 (July, 2001).
71 “Subparagraphs (c) and (d) prohibit, in turn, the disclosure or use of the contents of any
intercepted communication by any person knowing or having reason to know the information
was obtained through an interception in violation of this subsection. The disclosure of the
contents of an intercepted communication that had already become <public information’ or
<common knowledge’ would not be prohibited.  The scope of this knowledge required to
violate either subparagraph reflects existing law (Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1
(1954).”  The remark may also have been influenced by the high level of intent (willfully
rather than intentionally) included in the disclosure provision as reported out. 
72 “Any investigative or law enforcement officer who, by any means authorized by this
chapter, has obtained knowledge of the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic
communication, or evidence derived therefrom, may disclose such contents to another
investigative or law enforcement officer to the extent that such disclosure is appropriate to the
proper performance of the official duties of the officer making or receiving the disclosure,”
18 U.S.C. 2517(1).
73 “Any person who has received, by any means authorized by this chapter, any information
concerning a wire, oral, or electronic communication, or evidence derived therefrom
intercepted in accordance with the provisions of this chapter may disclose the contents of that
communication or such derivative evidence while giving testimony under oath or affirmation
in any proceeding held under the authority of the United States or of any State or political
subdivision thereof,” 18 U.S.C. 2517(3).  This does not entitle private litigants to disclosure
in the view of at least one court, In re Motion to Unseal Electronic Surveillance Evidence,
990 F.2d 1015 (8th Cir. 1993).
When court ordered interception results in evidence of a crime other than the crime with
(continued...)
except to the extent the First Amendment bans application.70  The legislative history
speaks of a common knowledge limitation on the statute’s coverage, but it is not clear
whether it refers to common knowledge at the time of interception or at the time
disclosure, S.REP.NO. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 93 (1967).71  By definition a
violation of paragraph 2511(1)(c) requires an earlier unlawful interception under
subsection 2511(1).  If there is no predicate unlawful interception there can be no
violation of paragraph 2511(1)(c).
The results of electronic eavesdropping authorized under Title III/ECPA may be
disclosed and used for law enforcement purposes 72 and for testimonial purposes.73 
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respect to which the order was issued, the evidence is admissible only upon a judicial finding
that it was otherwise secured in compliance with Title III/ECPA requirements, 18 U.S.C.
2517(5).
74  When acting with a similar intent, disclosure of the fact of authorized federal wiretap or
foreign intelligence gathering is proscribed elsewhere in title 18. “Whoever, having knowledge
that a Federal investigative or law enforcement officer has been authorized or has applied for
authorization under chapter 119 to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication, in
order to obstruct, impede, or prevent such interception, gives notice or attempts to give notice
of the possible interception to any person shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more
than five years, or both.”
“Whoever, having knowledge that a Federal officer has been authorized or has applied
for authorization to conduct electronic surveillance under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801, et seq.), in order to obstruct, impede, or prevent such activity,
gives notice or attempts to give notice of the possible activity to any person shall be fined
under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both,” 18 U.S.C. 2232(d),(e).
It is also a federal crime to disclose, with an intent to obstruct criminal justice,
any information derived from lawful police wiretapping or electronic eavesdropping,
i.e.:
• any person [who]
• intentionally discloses, or endeavors to disclose, to any other person 
•the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication
• intercepted by means authorized by sections:
- 2511(2)(a)(ii) (communication service providers, landlords, etc. who
assist police setting up wiretaps or electronic eavesdropping devices
- 2511(2)(b) (FCC regulatory activity)
- 2511(2)(c) (police one party consent)
- 2511(2)(e) (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act)
- 2516 (court ordered, police wiretapping or electronic surveillance)
- 2518 (emergency wiretaps or electronic surveillance) 
• knowing or having reason to know that 
• the information was obtained through the interception of such a communication
• in connection with a criminal investigation
• having obtained or received the information in connection with a criminal
investigation
• with intent to improperly obstruct, impede, or interfere with a duly authorized
criminal investigation,
•is subject to the same sanctions and remedies as one who illegally wiretaps, 18
U.S.C. 2511(1)(e).74
 
The proscriptions 2511(1)(e) would appear to apply to efforts to obstruct justice
by information gleaned from either federal or state police wiretaps.  Use of the word
“authorized” in conjunction with a list of federal statutes might suggest that the
paragraph was only intended to protect wiretap information gathered by federal rather
than by federal or state authorities.  But most of the cited sections do not “authorize”
anything; they simply confine the reach of the statutory prohibitions.  And several are
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75  “Subparagraphs (c) and (d) prohibit, in turn, the disclosure or use of the contents of any
intercepted communication by any person knowing or having reason to know the information
was obtained through an interception in violation of this subsection,” S.REP.NO. 1097, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess. 93 (1967).
76  Compare, 18 U.S.C. 2517(1)(“Any investigative or law enforcement officer who, by any
means authorized by this chapter, has obtained knowledge of the contents of any wire, oral,
or electronic communication, or evidence derived therefrom, may disclose such contents to
another investigative or law enforcement officer to the extent that such disclosure is
appropriate to the proper performance of the official duties of the officer making or receiving
the disclosure”), with 18 U.S.C. 2517(2)(“Any investigative or law enforcement officer who,
by any means authorized by this chapter, has obtained knowledge of the contents of any wire,
oral, or electronic communication or evidence derived therefrom may use such contents to the
extent such use is appropriate to the proper performance of his official duties”).
77 “[T]he naked prohibition against disclosures is fairly characterized as a regulation of pure
speech.  Unlike the prohibition against the <use’ of the contents of an illegal interception in
§2511(1)(d), subsection (c) is not a regulation of conduct,” 121 S.Ct. at 1761. 
as likely to involve state interceptions as federal, e.g., the one-party-consent-under-
color-of-law interceptions. 
Illegal Use of Information Obtained by Unlawful Wiretapping or Electronic
Eavesdropping
The prohibition on the use of information secured from illegal wiretapping or
electronic eavesdropping mirrors the disclosure provision, 18 U.S.C. 2511(1)(d):
• any person [who]
• intentionally
• uses or endeavors to use to another person
• the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication
• having reason to know
• that the information was obtained through the interception of a wire, oral, or
electronic communication
• in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2511(1)
• is subject to the same sanctions and remedies as the wiretapper or electronic
eavesdropper. 
The available case law under the use prohibition of section 2511(1)(d) is scant,
and the section has rarely been invoked except in conjunction with the disclosure
prohibition of section 2511(c).  The wording of the two is clearly parallel, the
legislative history describes them in the same breath,75 and they are treated alike for
law enforcement purposes.76  Bartnicki seems destined to change all that, because it
appears to parse the constitutionally suspect ban on disclosure from constitutionally
permissible ban on use.77  In doing so, it may also resolve a conflict among the lower
federal appellate courts over the so-called “clean hands” exception.  A few courts had
recognized an exception to the disclosure-use bans of section 2511(1) where law
enforcement officials might disclose or use the results of an illegal interception in
CRS-27
78 Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1541-545 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v. Murdock, 63
F.3d 1391, 1400-403 (6th Cir. 1995); contra, Berry v. Funk, 146 F.3d 1003, 1011-13
(D.C.Cir. 1998); Chandler v. United States Army, 125 F.3d 1296, 1300-302 (9th Cir. 1997);
In re Grand Jury, 111 F.3d 1066, 1077 (3d Cir. 1997); United States v. Vest, 813 F.2d 477,
481 (1st Cir. 1987).
79 “Unlike the prohibition against the <use’ of the contents of an illegal interception in
§2511(1)(d),* subsection (c) is not a regulation of conduct.
*”The Solicitor General has catalogued some of the cases that fall under subsection(d):
. . . . The statute has also been held to bar the use of illegally intercepted communications for
important and socially valuable purposes, See In re Grand Jury , 111 F.3d 1066, 1077-79 (3d
Cir. 1997),” 121 S.Ct. at 1761(footnote 10 of the Court’s opinion quoted after the *).
80  “It shall not be unlawful under this section for – (a) a provider of wire or electronic
communication service or an officer, agent, or employee of, or a person under contract with,
such a provider, in the normal course of the business of providing that wire or electronic
communication service . . . to send through the mail, send or carry in interstate or foreign
commerce, or manufacture, assemble, possess, or sell any electronic, mechanical, or other
device knowing or having reason to know that the design of such device renders it primarily
useful for the purpose of the surreptitious interception of wire, oral, or electronic
communications,” 18 U.S.C. 2512(2)(a).
81  “(2) It shall not be unlawful under this section for . . . (b) an officer, agent, or employee
of, or a person under contract with, the United States, a State, or a political subdivision
thereof, in the normal course of the activities of the United States, a State, or a political
subdivision thereof, to send through the mail, send or carry in interstate or foreign commerce,
or manufacture, assemble, possess, or sell any electronic, mechanical, or other device knowing
or having reason to know that the design of such device renders it primarily useful for the
purpose of the surreptitious interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications.
“(3) It shall not be unlawful under this section to advertise for sale a device described
in subsection (1) of this section if the advertisement is mailed, sent, or carried in interstate or
foreign commerce solely to a domestic provider of wire or electronic communication service
or to an agency of the United States, a State, or a political subdivision thereof which is duly
authorized to use such device,” 18 U.S.C. 2512(2)(b),(3).
82  United States v. Spy Factory, Inc., 961 F.Supp. 450, 473-75 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); United
States v. Bast, 495 F.2d 138, 141 (D.C.Cir. 1974).
which they had played no role.78  Bartnicki appears to dim the prospects of  a clean
hands exception when, to illustrate situations to which the section 2511(1)(d) use ban
might be applied constitutionally, it points to one of the cases which rejected to the
exception.79 
  Shipping, manufacturing, distributing, possessing or advertising wire, oral, or
electronic communication interception devices
 
The proscriptions for possession and trafficking in wiretapping and
eavesdropping devices are even more demanding than those that apply to the
predicate offense itself.  There are exemptions for service providers,80 government
officials and those under contract with the government,81  but there is no exemption
for equipment designed to be used by private individuals, lawfully but
surreptitiously.82                                                
The three prohibitions in section 2512 present generally common features,
declaring that:
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- sends through the mail or sends or carries in interstate or foreign
commerce
- any electronic, mechanical, or other device
- knowing or having reason to know 
- that the design of such device renders it primarily useful
- for the purpose of the surreptitious interception of wire, oral, or electronic
communications; or 
(b)
- manufactures, assembles, possesses, or sells 
- any electronic, mechanical, or other device
- knowing or having reason to know  
- that the design of such device renders it primarily useful 
- for the purpose of the surreptitious interception of wire, oral, or electronic
communications, and 
- that such device or any component thereof has been or will be sent
through the mail or transported in interstate or foreign commerce; or 
(c)
- places in any newspaper, magazine, handbill, or other publication 
- any advertisement of –
+ any electronic, mechanical, or other device 
+ knowing or having reason to know 
+ that the design of such device renders it primarily useful
+ for the purpose of the surreptitious interception of wire, oral, or
electronic communications; or
+ any other electronic, mechanical, or other device
+ where such advertisement promotes the use of such device 
+ for the purpose of the surreptitious interception of wire, oral, or
electronic communications
- knowing or having reason to know 
- that such advertisement will be sent through the mail or transported in
interstate or foreign commerce
• shall imprisoned for not more than 5 years and/or fined not more than
$250,000 (not more than $500,000 for organizations), 18 U.S.C. 2512.
The legislative history lists among the items Congress considered “primarily
useful for the purpose of the surreptitious interception of communications: the martini
olive transmitter, the spike mike, the infinity transmitter, and the microphone
disguised as a wristwatch, picture frame, cuff link, tie clip, fountain pen, stapler, or
cigarette pack,” S.REP.NO. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 95 (1968).
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83  The two appellate panel decisions that found the devices beyond the bounds of section
2512, United States v. Herring, 933 F.2d 932 (11th Cir. 1991) and United States v. Hux, 940
F.2d 314 (8th Cir. 1991) have been overturned en banc, United States v. Herring, 993 F.2d
784, 786 (11th Cir. 1993); United States v. Davis, 978 F.2d 415, 416 (8th Cir. 1992).
84  United States v. Harrell, 983 F.2d 36, 37-9 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. One Macom
Video Cipher II, 985 F.2d 258, 259-61 (6th Cir. 1993); United States v. Shriver, 989 F.2d.
898, 901-906 (7th Cir. 1992); United States v. Davis, 978 F.2d 415, 417-20 (8th Cir. 1992);
United States v. Lande, 968 F.2d 907, 910-11 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. McNutt, 908
F.2d 561, 564-65 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Herring, 993 F.2d 784, 786-89 (11th
Cir. 1991).
85 “(a). . . No person not being entitled thereto shall receive or assist in receiving any interstate
or foreign communication by radio and use such communication (or any information therein
contained) for his own benefit or for the benefit of another not entitled thereto.  No person
having received any intercepted radio communication or having become acquainted with the
contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such communication (or any part thereof)
knowing that such communication was intercepted, shall divulge or publish the existence,
contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such communication (or any part thereof)
or use such communication (or any information therein contained) for his own benefit or for
the benefit of another not entitled thereto.  This section shall not apply to the receiving,
divulging, publishing, or utilizing the contents of any radio communication which is
transmitted by any station for the use of the general public, which relates to ships, aircraft,
vehicles, or persons in distress, or which is transmitted by an amateur radio station operator
or by a citizens band radio operator.
“(b) The provisions of subsection (a) of this section shall not apply to the interception
or receipt by any individual, or the assisting (including the manufacture or sale) of such
interception or receipt, of any satellite cable programming for private viewing if – (1) the
programming involved is not encrypted; and  (2)(A) a marketing system is not established
under which – (i) an agent or agents have been lawfully designated for the purpose of
authorizing private viewing by individuals, and
(ii) such authorization is available to the individual involved from the appropriate agent or
agents; or (B) a marketing system described in subparagraph (A) is established and the
individuals receiving such programming has obtained authorization for private viewing under
that system . . .
“(2) Any person who violates subsection (a) of this section willfully and for purposes
of direct or indirect commercial advantage or private financial gain shall be fined not more
than $50,000 or imprisoned for not more than 2 years, or both, for the first such conviction
and shall be fined not more than $100,000 or imprisoned for not more than 5 years, or both,
for any subsequent conviction.
“(3)(A) Any person aggrieved by any violation of subsection (a) of this section or
paragraph (4) of this subsection may bring a civil action in a United States district court or
in any other court of competent jurisdiction.  (B) The court – (i) may grant temporary and
final injunctions on such terms as it may deem reasonable to prevent or restrain violations of
subsection (a) of this section; (ii) may award damages as described in subparagraph (C);  and
(iii) shall direct the recovery of full costs, including awarding reasonable attorneys’ fees to an
aggrieved party who prevails.  (C)(i) Damages awarded by any court under this section shall
be computed, at the election of the aggrieved party, in accordance with either of the following
(continued...)
Questions once raised over whether section 2512 covers equipment designed to
permit unauthorized reception of scrambled satellite television signals have been
resolved.83  Each of the circuits to consider the question have now concluded that
2512 outlaws such devices.84  Their use is also proscribed by 47 U.S.C. 605.85
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subclauses: (I) the party aggrieved may recover the actual damages suffered by him as a result
of the violation and any profits of the violator that are attributable to the violation which are
not taken into account in computing the actual damages;  in determining the violator’s profits,
the party aggrieved shall be required to prove only the violator’s gross revenue, and the
violator shall be required to prove his deductible expenses and the elements of profit
attributable to factors other than the violation; or (II) the party aggrieved may recover an
award of statutory damages for each violation of subsection (a) of this section involved in the
action in a sum of not less than $1,000 or more than $10,000, as the court considers just, and
for each violation of paragraph (4) of this subsection involved in the action an aggrieved party
may recover statutory damages in a sum not less than $10,000, or more than $100,000, as the
court considers just.  (ii) In any case in which the court finds that the violation was committed
willfully and for purposes of direct or indirect commercial advantage or private financial gain,
the court in its discretion may increase the award of damages, whether actual or statutory, by
an amount of not more than $100,000 for each violation of subsection (a) of this section.  (iii)
In any case where the court finds that the violator was not aware and had no reason to believe
that his acts constituted a violation of this section, the court in its discretion  may reduce the
award of damages to a sum of not less than $250.
“(4) Any person who manufactures, assembles, modifies, imports, exports, sells, or
distributes any electronic, mechanical, or other device or equipment, knowing or having reason
to know that the device or equipment is primarily of assistance in the unauthorized decryption
of satellite cable programming, or direct-to-home satellite services, or is intended for any other
activity prohibited by subsection (a) of this section, shall be fined not more than $500,000 for
each violation, or imprisoned for not more than 5 years for each violation, or both.  For
purposes of all penalties and remedies established for violations of this paragraph, the
prohibited activity established herein as it applies to each such device shall be deemed a
separate violation. . . .”
86  The courts differ somewhat over the circumstances under which stored communications can
be “intercepted” and thus subject to the protection of Title III as well, compare, United States
v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 1998)(unauthorized retrieval and recording of
another’s voice mail messages constitutes an “interception”); Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines,
Inc., 236 F.3d 1035, 1046 (9th Cir. 2001)(fraudulent access to a secure website constitutes
an “interception;” electronic communications are entitled to the same protection when they are
in storage as when are in transit); Fraser v. National Mutual Insurance Co., 135 F.Supp.2d
623, 634-37 (E.D.Pa. 2001)(“”interception” of e-mail occurs with its unauthorized acquisition
prior to initial receipt by its addressee); with, Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States
Secret Service, 36 F.3d 457, 461-62n.7 (5th Cir. 1994)(Congress did not intend for
“interception” to apply to e-mail stored on an electronic bulletin board; stored wire
communications (voice mail), however, is protected from “interception”); United States v.
(continued...)
Stored electronic communications
In its original form Title III was ill suited to ensure the privacy of those varieties
of modern communications which are equally vulnerable to intrusion when they are
at rest as when they are in transmission.  Surreptitious “access”“ is as least as great
a threat as surreptitious “interception” to the patrons of electronic mail (e-mail),
electronic bulletin boards, voice mail, pagers, and remote computer storage.  
Accordingly, Title III/ECPA also bans surreptitious access to communications
at rest, although it does so beyond the confines of that apply to interception, 18
U.S.C. 2701 - 2711.86  These separate provisions afford e-mail communications
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Meriwether, 917 F.2d 955, 959-60 (6th Cir. 1990)(access to stored information through the
use another’s pager does not constitute an “interception”); United States v. Reyes, 922
F.Supp. 818, 836-37 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)(same); Wesley College v. Pitts, 947 F.Supp. 375, 385
(D.Del. 1997)(no “interception” occurs when the contents of electronic communications are
acquired unless contemporaneous with their transmission); see also, Adams v. Battle Creek,
250 F.3d 980, 982 (6th Cir. 2001)(use of a “clone” or duplicate pager to simultaneously
receive the same message as a target pager is an “interception”); Brown v. Waddell, 50 F.3d
285, 294 (4th Cir. 1995)(same).
87  “Subsection (a) of this section does not apply with respect to conduct authorized -- (1) by
the person or entity providing a wire or electronic communications service; (2) by a user of
that service with respect to a communication of or intended for that user; or (3) in section
2703 [requirements for government access], 2704 [backup preservation] or 2518 [court
ordered wiretapping or electronic eavesdropping] of this title,” 18 U.S.C. 2701(c).
Section 2709 creates an exception for counterintelligence access to telephone records.
88  “The punishment for an offense under subsection (a) of this section is – (1) if the offense
is committed for purposes of commercial advantage, malicious destruction or damage, or
private commercial gain – (A) a fine of not more than $250,000 or imprisonment for not more
than one year, or both, in the case of a first offense under this subparagraph; and  (B)  a fine
under this title [of not more than $250,00 for an individual and of not more than $500,000 for
an organization with the alternative, if greater, of a fine equal to twice the gain or loss
associated with the offense], or imprisonment for not more than two years, or both, for any
subsequent offense under this subparagraph; and (2) a fine of not more than $5,000 or
imprisonment for not more than six months, or both, in any other case,” 18 U.S.C. 2701(b).
protection akin to that available for telephone and face to face conversations under
18 U.S.C. 2510-2522.  Thus, subject to certain exceptions, it is a federal crime to:
• intentionally
• either
- access without authorization or 
- exceed an authorization to access
• a facility through which an electronic communication service is provided
• and thereby obtain, alter, or prevent authorized access to a wire or electronic
communication while it is in electronic storage in such system, 18 U.S.C.
2701(a).  
The exceptions cover electronic storage facility operators, their customers, and
–under procedural counterparts to court ordered wiretapping – governmental
entities.87 
Violations committed for malicious or mercenary purposes are punishable by
imprisonment for not more than a year and/or a fine of not more than $250,000; lesser
transgressions, by imprisonment for not more than six months and/or a fine of not
more than $5,000.88   Those who provide the storage service and other victims of
unlawful access have a cause of action for equitable relief, reasonable attorneys’ fees
and costs, damages equal the loss and gain associated with the offense but not less
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89  “(a) Cause of action – Except as provided in section 2703(e)[relating to immunity for
compliance with judicial process], any provider of electronic communication service,
subscriber, or customer aggrieved by any violation of this chapter in which the conduct
constituting the violation is engaged in with a knowing or intentional state of mind may, in a
civil action, recover from the person or entity which engaged in that violation such relief as
may be appropriate.
“(b) Relief –  In a civil action under this section, appropriate relief includes – (1) such
preliminary and other equitable or declaratory relief as may be appropriate; (2) damages under
subsection(c); and (3) a reasonable attorney’s fee and other litigation costs reasonably
incurred;
“(c) Damages – The court may assess as damages in a civil action under this section the
sum of the actual damages suffered by the plaintiff and any profits made by the violator as
a result of the violation, but in no case shall a person entitled to recover receive less than the
sum of $1,000. . . .” 18 U.S.C. 2707.
90  “A good faith reliance on – (1) a court warrant or order, a grand jury subpoena, a
legislative authorization, or a statutory authorization; (2) a request of an investigative or law
enforcement officer under section 2518(7) of this title [relating to emergency wiretapping and
electronic eavesdropping]; or (3) a good faith determination that section 2511(3) of this title
[relating to the circumstances under which an electronic communications provider may divulge
the contents of communication] permitted the conduct complained of – is a complete defense
to any civil or criminal action brought under this chapter or any other law,” 18 U.S.C.
2707(e).
91  “(1) a person or entity providing an electronic communication service to the public shall
not knowingly divulge to any person or entity the contents of a communication while in
electronic storage by that service; 
“(2) a person or entity providing remote computing service to the public shall not
knowingly divulge to any person or entity the contents of any communication which is carried
or maintained on that service – (A) on behalf of, and received by means of electronic
transmission from (or created by means of computer processing of communications
received by means of electronic transmission from), a subscriber or customer of such
service; and (B) solely for the purpose of providing storage or computer processing
services to such subscriber or customer, if the provider is not authorized to access the
contents of any such communications for purposes of providing any services other
than storage or computer processing,” 18 U.S.C. 2702(a)(1),(2).
Section 2702 makes no mention of any consequences that follow a breach of its
commands, but 2707 establishes a civil cause of action for the victims of any violation
of chapter 211 (18 U.S.C. 2701 - 2711).
than $1000.89   Both criminal and civil liability are subject to good faith defenses.90 
                                       
Unlike wiretapping, unlawful disclosure or use of the contents of stored
electronic communications by service providers or by governmental entities with
lawful access, is not a crime under section 2701.  Service providers, nevertheless, may
incur civil liability for unlawful disclosures, 91 unless they can take advantage of any
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92  “A person or entity may divulge the contents of a communication – (1) to an addressee or
intended recipient of such communication or an agent of such addressee or intended recipient;
(2) as otherwise authorized in section 2517, 2511(2)(a), or 2703 of this title; (3) with the
lawful consent of the originator or an addressee or intended recipient of such communication,
or the subscriber in the case of remote computing service; (4) to a person employed or
authorized or whose facilities are used to forward such communication to its destination; (5)
as may be necessarily incident to the rendition of the service or to the protection of the rights
or property of the provider of that service; or (6) to a law enforcement agency, if such contents
– (A) were inadvertently obtained by the service provider; and (B) appear to pertain to the
commission of a crime,” 18 U.S.C. 2702(b).
Liability under section 2707 is subject to a defense based upon a good faith reliance on
a court order, a warrant, a grand jury subpoena, legislative or statutory authorization, a law
enforcement request for assistance with respect to emergency wiretapping or electronic
eavesdropping, or upon an assumption that the disclosure is related to lawful wiretapping or
electronic eavesdropping, 18 U.S.C. 2707(e).
93  Citations to the various state computer abuse statutes are appended.
94 “(3) the term <pen register’ means a device which records or decodes electronic or other
impulses which identify the numbers dialed or otherwise transmitted on the telephone line to
which such device is attached, but such term does not include any device used by a provider
or customer of a wire or electronic communication service for billing, or recording as an
incident to billing, for communications services provided by such provider or any device used
by a provider or customer of a wire communication service for cost accounting or other like
purposes in the ordinary course of its business; (4) the term <trap and trace device’ means a
device which captures the incoming electronic or other impulses which identify the originating
number of an instrument or device from which a wire or electronic communication was
transmitted,” 18 U.:S.C. 3127(3),(4)).  Although clone pagers are considered  not pen
registers, Brown v. Waddell, 50 F.3d 285, 290-91 (4th Cir. 1995), “caller id” services have
been found to constitute trap and trace devices, United States v. Fregoso, 60 F.3d 1314, 1320
(8th Cir. 1995).
95  “(a) In general – Except as provided in this section, no person may install or use a pen
(continued...)
of a fairly extensive list of exceptions and defenses.92                                              
                       
Unlawful access to electronic communications may involve violations of several
other federal and state laws, including for instance the federal computer fraud and
abuse statute, 18 U.S.C. 1030, and state computer abuse statutes.93   
Pen registers and trap and trace devices
A trap and trace device identifies the source of incoming calls, and a pen register
indicates the numbers called from a particular phone.94  Since neither allows the
eavesdropper to overhear the “contents” of the phone conversation they were not
interceptions within the reach of Title III prior to the enactment of ECPA, United
States v. New York Telephone Co., 434 U.S. 160 (1977).  Although Congress elected
to expand the definition of interception, it chose to continue to regulate these devices
beyond the boundaries of Title III, 18 U.S.C. 3121 - 3127.  Their use or installation
by anyone other than the telephone company or those acting under judicial authority,
however, is a federal crime, punishable by imprisonment for not more than a year
and/or a fine of not more than $100,000 ($200,000 for an organization).95  There is
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register or a trap and trace device without first obtaining a court order under section 3123 of
this title or under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.).
“(b) Exception – The prohibition of subsection (a) does not apply with respect to the use
of a pen register or a trap and trace device by a provider of electronic or wire communication
service – (1) relating to the operation, maintenance, and testing of a wire or electronic
communication service or to the protection of the rights or property of such provider, or to the
protection of users of that service from abuse of service or unlawful use of service; or (2) to
record the fact that a wire or electronic communication was initiated or completed in order to
protect such provider, another provider furnishing service toward the completion of the wire
communication, or a user of that service, from fraudulent, unlawful or abusive use of service;
or (3) where the consent of the user of that service has been obtained.
“(c) Limitation – A government agency authorized to install and use a pen register under
this chapter or under State law shall use technology reasonably available to it that restricts the
recording or decoding of electronic or other impulses to the dialing and signaling information
utilized in call processing. (d) Penalty.– Whoever knowingly violates subsection (a) shall be
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both,” 18 U.S.C. 3121.
96  United States v. Fregoso, 60 F.3d 1314, 1320 (8th Cir. 1995); United States v. Thompson,
936 F.2d 1249, 1249-250 (11th Cir. 1991).
no accompanying exclusionary rule, however, and consequently a violation of section
3121 will serve as a basis to suppress any resulting evidence.96
Unlike other violations of Title III/ECPA, there is no separate federal private
cause of action for victims of a pen register or trap and trace device violation.  Some
of the states have established a separate criminal offense for unlawful use of a pen
register or trap and trace device, yet most of these do seem to follow the federal lead
and decline to establish a separate private cause of action,  See Appendix III.
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. 1801 - 1811, creates a
procedure for judicially supervised wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping for
foreign intelligence gathering purposes.  The Act classifies four kinds of wiretapping
and electronic eavesdropping as “electronic surveillance” and proscribes
• intentionally
• either
- engaging in electronic surveillance
- under color of law
- except as authorized by statute, or
- disclosing or using
- information obtained under color of law 
- by electronic surveillance,
- knowing or having reason to know
- that the information was obtained by electronic surveillance not authorized
by statute, 18 U.S.C. 1809.
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97  Federal officers or employees may also enjoy a defense under Bartnicki v. Vopper, 121
S.Ct. 1753 (2001), for disclosing illegal intercepted information of great public concern,
following their own lawful acquisition.
98  “An aggrieved person, other than a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power, as
defined in section 1801(a) or (b)(1)(A) of this title, respectively, who has been subjected to
an electronic surveillance or about whom information obtained by electronic surveillance of
such person has been disclosed or used in violation of section 1809 of this title shall have a
cause of action against any person who committed such violation and shall be entitled to
recover – (a) actual damages, but not less than liquidated damages of $1,000 or $100 per day
for each day of violation, whichever is greater; (b) punitive damages; and (c) reasonable
attorney’s fees and other investigation and litigation costs reasonably incurred,” 50 U.S.C.
1810.
99  ACLU Foundation of Southern California v. Barr, 952 F.2d 457, 469-70 (D.C.Cir.
1992)(the court did not address the question of whether conduct in violation of both FISA and
Title III/EPCA  might be enjoined under 18 U.S.C. 2520(b)(1)).
100  “If the United States district court pursuant to subsection (f) of this section determines that
the surveillance was not lawfully authorized or conducted, it shall, in accordance with the
requirements of law, suppress the evidence which was unlawfully obtained or derived from
(continued...)
The four classes of electronic surveillance involve wiretapping or electronic
eavesdropping that could otherwise only be conducted under court order:
“(1) the acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device of
the contents of any wire or radio communication sent by or intended to be received
by a particular, known United States person who is in the United States, if the
contents are acquired by intentionally targeting that United States person, under
circumstances in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant
would be required for law enforcement purposes;
“(2) the acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device of
the contents of any wire communication to or from a person in the United States,
without the consent of any party thereto, if such acquisition occurs in the United
States;
“(3) the intentional acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance
device of the contents of any radio communication, under circumstances in which a
person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for
law enforcement purposes, and if both the sender and all intended recipients are
located within the United States; or
“(4) the installation or use of an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance
device in the United States for monitoring to acquire information, other than from a
wire or radio communication, under circumstances in which a person has a reasonable
expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for law enforcement
purposes,” 50 U.S.C. 1801(f).
The prohibitions do not apply to a law enforcement officer operating under a
warrant or court order, 50 U.S.C. 1809.97  Violations are punishable by imprisonment
for not more than 5 years and/or a fine of not more than $250,000, id. and expose the
offender to civil liability, 50 U.S.C. 1810,98(other than injunctive restrictions).99  FISA
also has its own exclusionary rule,100 but Congress anticipated,101 and the courts have
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electronic surveillance of the aggrieved person or otherwise grant the motion of the aggrieved
person.  If the court determines that the surveillance was lawfully authorized and conducted,
it shall deny the motion of the aggrieved person except to the extent that due process requires
discovery or disclosure,” 50 U.S.C. 1806(g).
“Whenever a court or other authority is notified pursuant to subsection (c) or (d) of this
section, or whenever a motion is made pursuant to subsection (e) of this section, or whenever
any motion or request is made by an aggrieved person pursuant to any other statute or rule of
the United States or any State before any court or other authority of the United States or any
State to discover or obtain applications or orders or other materials relating to electronic
surveillance or to discover, obtain, or suppress evidence or information obtained or derived
from electronic surveillance under this chapter, the United States district court or, where the
motion is made before another authority, the United States district court in the same district
as the authority, shall, notwithstanding any other law, if the Attorney General files an affidavit
under oath that disclosure or an adversary hearing would harm the national security of the
United States, review in camera and ex parte the application, order, and such other materials
relating to the surveillance as may be necessary to determine whether the surveillance of the
aggrieved person was lawfully authorized and conducted.  In making this determination, the
court may disclose to the aggrieved person, under appropriate security procedures and
protective orders, portions of the application, order, or other materials relating to the
surveillance only where such disclosure is necessary to make an accurate determination of the
legality of the surveillance,” 50 U.S.C. 1806(f).
101  S.REP.NO. 701, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.  61 (1978); 50 U.S.C. 1806(b)(“. . . such information
. . . may only be used in a criminal proceeding with the advance authorization of the Attorney
General”).
102  There is some debate, however, over how prominent the foreign intelligence purpose must
be, United States v. Johnson, 952 F.2d 565, 572 (1st Cir. 1992)(“Although evidence obtained
under FISA subsequently may be used in criminal prosecutions, the investigation of criminal
activity cannot be the primary purpose of the surveillance”); United States v. Duggan, 743
F.2d 59, 77 (2d Cir. 1984)(“The requirement that foreign intelligence information be the
primary objective of the surveillance is plain. . .”); United States v. Sarkissian, 841 F.2d 959,
964 (9th Cir. 1988) (“Defendants rely on the primary purpose test . . . . We . . . decline to
decide the issue.  We have generally stated that the purpose of the surveillance must be to
secure foreign intelligence information. . . .  We refuse to draw too fine a distinction between
criminal and intelligence investigations”); United States v. Badia, 827 F.2d 1458, 1463 (11th
Cir. 1987)(“An application for a FISA order must contain certification by a designated
official of the executive branch that the purpose of the surveillance is to secure foreign
intelligence information. . . . Once the certification is made, it is subjected to only minimal
scrutiny by the courts”).
acknowledged, that surveillance conducted under FISA for foreign intelligence




Each of the prohibitions mentioned above recognizes a procedure for
government use notwithstanding the general ban, usually under judicial supervision.
Although Fourth Amendment concerns supply a common theme, the procedures are
individually distinctive.
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103  “The Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General, Associate Attorney General, or any
Assistant Attorney General, any acting Assistant Attorney General, or any Deputy Assistant
Attorney General or acting Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Criminal Division
specially designated by the Attorney General, may authorize an application to a Federal judge
of competent jurisdiction for, and such judge may grant in conformity with section 2518 of
this chapter an order authorizing or approving the interception of wire or oral communications
by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or a Federal agency having responsibility for the
investigation of the offense as to which the application is made, when such interception may
provide or has provided evidence of [the predicate offenses]. . .” 18 U.S.C. 2516(1).
104  The predicate offense list includes conspiracy to violate or violations of: (1) 8 U.S.C. 1324
(smuggling aliens), 1327 (same), or 1328 (same); (2) bankruptcy fraud; (3) 18 U.S.C. §§32
(destruction of aircraft or their facilities), 33 (destruction of motor vehicles or their facilities),
115 (threatening or retaliating against federal officials), 38 (aircraft parts fraud), 175
(biological weapons), 201 (bribery of public officials and witnesses), 215 (bribery of bank
officials), 224 (bribery in sporting contests), 351 (assassinations, kidnapping, and assault of
Members of Congress and certain other officials), 471-473 (counterfeiting), 659 (theft from
interstate shipment), 664 (embezzlement from pension and welfare funds), 751 (escape), 791-
798 (espionage and related felonies), 831 (traffic in nuclear materials), 844(d), (e), (f), (g),
(h), or (i) (unlawful use of explosives), 892-894 (loansharking), 922 (firearms felonies), 924
(same), 1014 (bank fraud), 1028 (false identity felonies), 1029 (credit card fraud), 1032 (bank
fraud), 1084 (gambling), 1203 (hostage taking), 1341 (mail fraud), 1343 (wire fraud), 1344
(bank fraud), 1361-1367 (felonies relating to malicious mischief), 1425-1427 (immigration
offenses), 1460-1469 (felonies relating to obscenity), 1503 (obstruction of justice), 1510-1513
(same), 1541-1546 (passport crimes), 1651-1661 (felonies relating to piracy), 1751
(assassination, kidnapping, and assault of the president and certain other executive officials),
1831-1839 (economic espionage); 1951 (Hobbs Act), 1952 (Travel Act), 1954 (bribery
relating to employee benefit plans), 1955 (gambling), 1956 (money laundering), 1957 (same),
1958 (murder for hire), 1959 (violence in aid of racketeering), 1963 (RICO), 1992 (wrecking
trains), 2101-2102 (felonies relating to riots), 2151-2156 (sabotage and related felonies), 2251
and 2252 (sexual exploitation of children), 2271-2281 (felonies relating to shipping), 2312-
2315 (interstate transportation of stolen property), 2321 (illicit trafficking in motor vehicles
or motor vehicle parts), 2381-2390 (treason and related felonies), 2511 (wiretapping), 2512
(wiretapping device offenses) 3146 (bail jumping), 3521(b)(3) (disclosing information relating
to witness relocation), and any other provision of title 18 of the United States Code involving
murder, kidnapping, robbery, or extortion;(4) drug trafficking; (5) 22 U.S.C. 2778 (Arms
Export Control Act offenses); (6) 26 U.S.C. §5861 (firearms offenses); (7) 29 U.S.C. §§186
(corruption of labor unions), 501(c)(same); (8) 31 U.S.C. §5322 (money laundering); (9) 42
U.S.C. §§2274-2277 (felonies under the Atomic Energy Act); 2284 (felonies relating to
sabotage at nuclear facilities); and (10) 49 U.S.C. §§60123(b) (destruction of a natural gas
pipeline), 46502 (air piracy).
Law Enforcement Wiretapping and Electronic Eavesdropping
Title III/ECPA authorizes both federal and state law enforcement wiretapping
and electronic eavesdropping, under court order, without the prior consent or
knowledge of any of the participants, 18 U.S.C. 2516 - 2518.  At the federal level, a
senior Justice Department official must approve the application for the court order.103
The procedure is only available where there is probable cause to believe that the
wiretap or electronic eavesdropping will produce evidence of one of a long, but not
exhaustive, list of federal crimes,104 or of the whereabouts of a “fugitive from justice”
fleeing from prosecution of one of the offenses on the predicate offense list, 18 U.S.C.
2516(1)(l).  Any federal prosecutor may approve an application for a court order
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105  “Any attorney for the Government (as such term is defined for the purposes of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure) may authorize an application to a Federal judge of competent
jurisdiction for, and such judge may grant, in conformity with section 2518 of this title, an
order authorizing or approving the interception of electronic communications by an
investigative or law enforcement officer having responsibility for the investigation of the
offense as to which the application is made, when such interception may provide or has
provided evidence of any Federal felony,” 18 U.S.C. 2516(3).
106  “The principal prosecuting attorney of any State, or the principal prosecuting attorney of
any political subdivision thereof, if such attorney is authorized by a statute of that State to
make application to a State court judge of competent jurisdiction for an order authorizing or
approving the interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications, may apply to such
judge for, and such judge may grant in conformity with section 2518 of this chapter and with
the applicable State statute an order authorizing, or approving the interception of wire, oral,
or electronic communications by investigative or law enforcement officers having
responsibility for the investigation of the offense as to which the application is made, when
such interception may provide or has provided evidence of the commission of the offense of
murder, kidnapping, gambling, robbery, bribery, extortion, or dealing in narcotic drugs,
marihuana or other dangerous drugs, or other crime dangerous to life, limb, or property, and
punishable by imprisonment for more than one year, designated in any applicable State statute
authorizing such interception, or any conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing offenses,” 18
U.S.C. 2516(2).
107  Requirements that may be excused under the circumstances provided in subsections (11)
and (12) sometimes referred to as authorizing “roving wiretaps”:
 “The requirements of subsections (1)(b)(ii) and (3)(d) of this section relating to the
specification of the facilities from which, or the place where, the communication is to be
intercepted do not apply if – (a) in the case of an application with respect to the interception
of an oral communication – (i) the application is by a Federal investigative or law enforcement
officer and is approved by the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General, the Associate
Attorney General, an Assistant Attorney General, or an acting Assistant Attorney General;
(continued...)
authorizing the interception of e-mail or other electronic communications upon
probable cause of a felony.105
At the state level, the principal prosecuting attorney of a state or any of its
political subdivisions may approve an application for an order authorizing wiretapping
or electronic eavesdropping based upon probable cause to believe that it will produce
evidence of a felony under the state laws covering murder, kidnapping, gambling,
robbery, bribery, extortion, drug trafficking, or any other crime dangerous to life, limb
or property.  State applications, court orders and other procedures must at a minimum
be as demanding as federal requirements.106 
Applications for a court order authorizing wiretapping and electronic
surveillance include:
• the identity of the applicant and the official who authorized the application;
• a full and complete statement of the facts including
- details of the crime,
- a particular description of nature, location and place where the
interception is to occur,107* 
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(ii) the application contains a full and complete statement as to why such specification is not
practical and identifies the person committing the offense and whose communications are to
be intercepted; and (iii) the judge finds that such specification is not practical; and (b) in the
case of an application with respect to a wire or electronic communication – (i) the application
is by a Federal investigative or law enforcement officer and is approved by the Attorney
General, the Deputy Attorney General, the Associate Attorney General, an Assistant Attorney
General, or an acting Assistant Attorney General; (ii) the application identifies the person
believed to be committing the offense and whose communications are to be intercepted and the
applicant makes a showing of a purpose, on the part of that person, to thwart interception by
changing facilities; and (iii) the judge finds that such purpose has been adequately shown.
“An interception of a communication under an order with respect to which the
requirements of subsections (1)(b)(ii) and (3)(d) of this section do not apply by reason of
subsection (11) shall not begin until the facilities from which, or the place where, the
communication is to be intercepted is ascertained by the person implementing the interception
order.  A provider of wire or electronic communications service that has received an order as
provided for in subsection (11)(b) may move the court to modify or quash the order on the
ground that its assistance with respect to the interception cannot be performed in a timely or
reasonable fashion.  The court, upon notice to the government, shall decide such a motion
expeditiously,” 18 U.S.C. 2518(11), (12).
- a particular description of the communications to be intercepted, and
- the identities (if known) of the person committing the offense and of the
persons whose communications are to be intercepted; 
• a full and complete statement of the alternative investigative techniques used
or an explanation of why they would be futile or dangerous;
• a statement of period of time for which the interception is to be maintained and
if it will not terminate upon seizure of the communications sought, a probable
cause demonstration that further similar communications are likely to occur;
• a full and complete history of previous interception applications or efforts
involving the same parties or places;
• in the case of an extension, the results to date or explanation for the want of
results; and
• any additional information the judge may require, 18 U.S.C. 2518(1), (2).
Before issuing an order authorizing interception, the court must find:
• probable cause to believe that an individual is, has or is about to commit one
or more of the predicate offenses;
• probable cause to believe that the particular communications concerning the
crime will be seized as a result of the interception requested; 
• that normal investigative procedures have been or are likely to be futile or too
dangerous; and 
• probable cause to believe that “the facilities from which, or the place where, the
wire, oral, or electronic communications are to be intercepted are being used, or
are about to be used, in connection with the commission of such offense, or are
leased to, listed in the name of, or commonly used by such person,” 18 U.S.C.
2518(3).*
Subsections 2518(4) and (5) demand that any interception order include: 
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108  “. . . An order authorizing the interception of a wire, oral, or electronic communication
under this chapter shall, upon request of the applicant, direct that a provider of wire or
electronic communication service, landlord, custodian or other person shall furnish the
applicant forthwith all information, facilities, and technical assistance necessary to accomplish
the interception unobtrusively and with a minimum of interference with the services that such
service provider, landlord, custodian, or person is according the person whose
communications are to be intercepted.  Any provider of wire or electronic communication
service, landlord, custodian or other person furnishing such facilities or technical assistance
shall be compensated therefor by the applicant for reasonable expenses incurred in providing
such facilities or assistance.  Pursuant to section 2522 of this chapter, an order may also be
issued to enforce the assistance capability and capacity requirements under the
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act,” 18 U.S.C. 2518(4).
109  “Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, any investigative or law enforcement
officer, specially designated by the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General, the
Associate Attorney General or by the principal prosecuting attorney of any State or
subdivision thereof acting pursuant to a statute of that State, who reasonably determines that
– (a) an emergency situation exists that involves – (i) immediate danger of death or serious
physical injury to any person, (ii) conspiratorial activities threatening the national security
interest, or (iii) conspiratorial activities characteristic of organized crime – that requires a
wire, oral, or electronic communication to be intercepted before an order authorizing such
interception can, with due diligence, be obtained, and
“(b) there are grounds upon which an order could be entered under this chapter to
authorize such interception, may intercept such wire, oral, or electronic communication if an
application for an order approving the interception is made in accordance with this section
within forty-eight hours after the interception has occurred, or begins to occur. In the absence
of an order, such interception shall immediately terminate when the communication sought is
obtained or when the application for the order is denied, whichever is earlier. In the event such
application for approval is denied, or in any other case where the interception is terminated
without an order having been issued, the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic
communication intercepted shall be treated as having been obtained in violation of this
(continued...)
• the identity (if known) of the persons whose conversations are to be
intercepted;
• the nature and location of facilities and place covered by the order; 
• a particular description of the type of communication to be intercepted and an
indication of the crime to which it relates; 
• individual approving the application and the agency executing the order;
• the period of time during which the interception may be conducted and an
indication of whether it may continue after the communication sought has been
seized; 
• an instruction that the order shall be executed 
- as soon as practicable, and
- so as to minimize the extent of innocent communication seized; and
• upon request, a direction for the cooperation of communications providers and
others necessary or useful for the execution of the order.108 
Compliance with these procedures may be postponed until after the interception
effort has begun, upon the approval of senior Justice Department officials in
emergency cases involving organized crime or national security threatening
conspiracies or involving the risk of death or serious injury, 18 U.S.C. 2718(7).109
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chapter, and an inventory shall be served as provided for in subsection (d) of this section on
the person named in the application,” 18 U.S.C. 2518(7).
The authority of the court orders extends only as long as required but not more
than 30 days.  After 30 days, the court may grant 30 day extensions subject to the
procedures required for issuance of the original order, 18 U.S.C. 2518(5).  During
that time the court may require progress reports at such intervals as it considers
appropriate, 18 U.S.C. 2518(6).
Intercepted communications are to be recorded and the evidence secured and
placed under seal (with the possibility of copies for authorized law enforcement
disclosure and use) along with the application and the court’s order, 18 U.S.C.
2518(8)(a),(b).
Within 90 days of the expiration of the order those whose communications have
been intercepted are entitled to notice, and evidence secured through the intercept
may be introduced into evidence with 10 days advance notice to the parties, 18 U.S.C.
2518(8)(d), (9).
Stored Electronic Communications
The procedural requirements for law enforcement access to stored electronic
communications and transactional records are less demanding but equally
complicated.  They deal with two kinds of information: the content of electronic
communications and communications records.  The law subdivides each of the two
– distinguishing in the case of electronic communications between recent electronic
communications, electronic communications that are more than six months old, and
electronic communications that are remotely stored.  Access to transactional records
is governed by whether the requester is a governmental entity or not.
Government officials may gain access to electronic communications in electronic
storage for less than 6 months under a search warrant issued upon probable cause to
believe a crime has been committed and the search will produce evidence of the
offense, 18 U.S.C. 2703(a).  
The government must used the same procedure to acquire older communications
or those stored in remote computer storage if access is to be afforded without notice
to the subscriber or customer, 18 U.S.C. 2703(b)(1)(A).  If the government officials
are willing to afford the subscriber or customer prior notice, access may be granted
under a court order showing that the information sought is relevant and material to
a criminal investigation or under an administrative subpoena, a grand jury subpoena,
a trial subpoena, or court order, 18 U.S.C. 2703(b)(1)(B),(d).
General identifying and billing information is available to the government
pursuant to an administrative subpoena, a grand jury or trial subpoena, a warrant, with
the consent of the subscriber or customer, or under a court order issued with a
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110  Section 2703 in its entirety provides: “(a) Contents of electronic communications in
electronic storage –A governmental entity may require the disclosure by a provider of
electronic communication service of the contents of an electronic communication, that is in
electronic storage in an electronic communications system for one hundred and eighty days
or less, only pursuant to a warrant issued under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure or
equivalent State warrant.  A governmental entity may require the disclosure by a provider of
electronic communications services of the contents of an electronic communication that has
been in electronic storage in an electronic communications system for more than one hundred
and eighty days by the means available under subsection (b) of this section.
“(b) Contents of electronic communications in a remote computing service – (1) A
governmental entity may require a provider of remote computing service to disclose the
contents of any electronic communication to which this paragraph is made applicable by
paragraph (2) of this subsection – (A) without required notice to the subscriber or customer,
if the governmental entity obtains a warrant issued under the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure or equivalent State warrant; or (B) with prior notice from the governmental entity
to the subscriber or customer if the governmental entity – (i) uses an administrative subpoena
authorized by a Federal or State statute or a Federal or State grand jury or trial subpoena; or
(ii) obtains a court order for such disclosure under subsection (d) of this section; except that
delayed notice may be given pursuant to section 2705 of this title.  (2) Paragraph (1) is
applicable with respect to any electronic communication that is held or maintained on that
service – (A) on behalf of, and received by means of electronic transmission from (or created
by means of computer processing of communications received by means of electronic
transmission from), a subscriber or customer of such remote computing service; and (B) solely
for the purpose of providing storage or computer processing services to such subscriber or
customer, if the provider is not authorized to access the contents of any such communications
for purposes of providing any services other than storage or computer processing.
“(c) Records concerning electronic communication service or remote computing service
– (1)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), a provider of electronic communication
service or remote computing service may disclose a record or other information pertaining to
a subscriber to or customer of such service (not including the contents of communications
covered by subsection (a) or (b) of this section) to any person other than a governmental
entity.  (B) A provider of electronic communication service or remote computing service shall
disclose a record or other information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of such service
(not including the contents of communications covered by subsection (a) or (b) of this section)
to a governmental entity only when the governmental entity – (i) obtains a warrant issued
under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure or equivalent State warrant; (ii) obtains a court
order for such disclosure under subsection (d) of this section; (iii) has the consent of the
subscriber or customer to such disclosure; or (iv) submits a formal written request relevant
to a law enforcement investigation concerning telemarketing fraud for the name, address, and
place of business of a subscriber or customer of such provider, which subscriber or customer
is engaged in telemarketing (as such term is defined in section 2325 of this title).  (C) A
provider of electronic communication service or remote computing service shall disclose to
a governmental entity the name, address, local and long distance telephone toll billing records,
telephone number or other subscriber number or identity, and length of service of a subscriber
to or customer of such service and the types of services the subscriber or customer utilized,
when the governmental entity uses an administrative subpoena authorized by a Federal or
State statute or a Federal or State grand jury or trial subpoena or any means available under
subparagraph (B).  (2) A governmental entity receiving records or information under this
subsection is not required to provide notice to a subscriber or customer.
(continued...)




“(d) Requirements for court order – A court order for disclosure under subsection (b)
or (c) may be issued by any court that is a court of competent jurisdiction described in section
3127(2)(A) and shall issue only if the governmental entity offers specific and articulable facts
showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of a wire or electronic
communication, or the records or other information sought, are relevant and material to an
ongoing criminal investigation.  In the case of a State governmental authority, such a court
order shall not issue if prohibited by the law of such State.  A court issuing an order pursuant
to this section, on a motion made promptly by the service provider, may quash or modify such
order, if the information or records requested are unusually voluminous in nature or
compliance with such order otherwise would cause an undue burden on such provider.
“(e) No cause of action against a provider disclosing information under this chapter –
No cause of action shall lie in any court against any provider of wire or electronic
communication service, its officers, employees, agents, or other specified persons for
providing information, facilities, or assistance in accordance with the terms of a court order,
warrant, subpoena, or certification under this chapter.
“(f) Requirement to preserve evidence. – (1) In general. – A provider of wire or
electronic communication services or a remote computing service, upon the request of a
governmental entity, shall take all necessary steps to preserve records and other evidence in
its possession pending the issuance of a court order or other process.  (2) Period of retention.
– Records referred to in paragraph (1) shall be retained for a period of 90 days, which shall
be extended for an additional 90-day period upon a renewed request by the governmental
entity.”
111  “(a) Application – (1) An attorney for the Government may make application for an order
or an extension of an order under section 3123 of this title authorizing or approving the
installation and use of a pen register or a trap and trace device under this chapter, in writing
under oath or equivalent affirmation, to a court of competent jurisdiction.  (2) Unless
prohibited by State law, a State investigative or law enforcement officer may make application
for an order or an extension of an order under section 3123 of this title authorizing or
approving the installation and use of a pen register or a trap and trace device under this
chapter, in writing under oath or equivalent affirmation, to a court of competent jurisdiction
of such State.
“(b) Contents of application – An application under subsection (a) of this section shall
include – (1) the identity of the attorney for the Government or the State law enforcement or
investigative officer making the application and the identity of the law enforcement agency
conducting the investigation; and (2) a certification by the applicant that the information likely
to be obtained is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation being conducted by that
agency,” 18 U.S.C. 3122.
Pen Registers and Trap and Trace Devices
Pen registers and trap and trace devices identify the source of calls placed to or
from a particular telephone.  Federal government attorneys and state and local police
officers may apply for a court order authorizing the installation and use of a pen
register and/or a trap and trace device upon certification that the information that will
provide is relevant to a pending criminal investigation, 18 U.S.C. 3122.111 




112  “(a) Pen registers – Upon the request of an attorney for the Government or an officer of
a law enforcement agency authorized to install and use a pen register under this chapter, a
provider of wire or electronic communication service, landlord, custodian, or other person
shall furnish such investigative or law enforcement officer forthwith all information, facilities,
and technical assistance necessary to accomplish the installation of the pen register
unobtrusively and with a minimum of interference with the services that the person so ordered
by the court accords the party with respect to whom the installation and use is to take place,
if such assistance is directed by a court order as provided in section 3123(b)(2) of this title.
“(b) Trap and trace device –Upon the request of an attorney for the Government or an
officer of a law enforcement agency authorized to receive the results of a trap and trace device
under this chapter, a provider of a wire or electronic communication service, landlord,
custodian, or other person shall install such device forthwith on the appropriate line and shall
furnish such investigative or law enforcement officer all additional information, facilities and
technical assistance including installation and operation of the device unobtrusively and with
a minimum of interference with the services that the person so ordered by the court accords
the party with respect to whom the installation and use is to take place, if such installation and
assistance is directed by a court order as provided in section 3123(b)(2) of this title.  Unless
otherwise ordered by the court, the results of the trap and trace device shall be furnished,
pursuant to section 3123(b) or section 3125 of this title, to the officer of a law enforcement
agency, designated in the court order, at reasonable intervals during regular business hours
for the duration of the order.
“(c) Compensation – A provider of a wire or electronic communication service, landlord,
custodian, or other person who furnishes facilities or technical assistance pursuant to this
section shall be reasonably compensated for such reasonable expenses incurred in providing
such facilities and assistance.
 “(d) No cause of action against a provider disclosing information under this chapter –
No cause of action shall lie in any court against any provider of a wire or electronic
communication service, its officers, employees, agents, or other specified persons for
providing information, facilities, or assistance in accordance with the terms of a court order
under this chapter or request pursuant to section 3125 of this title.
“(e) Defense – A good faith reliance on a court order under this chapter, a request
pursuant to section 3125 of this title, a legislative authorization, or a statutory authorization
is a complete defense against any civil or criminal action brought under this chapter or any
other law.
“(f) Communications assistance enforcement orders – Pursuant to section 2522, an order
may be issued to enforce the assistance capability and capacity requirements under the
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act,” 18 U.S.C. 3124.
113  “(a) In general – Upon an application made under section 3122 of this title, the court shall
enter an ex parte order authorizing the installation and use of a pen register or a trap and trace
device within the jurisdiction of the court if the court finds that the attorney for the
Government or the State law enforcement or investigative officer has certified to the court that
(continued...)
- the person (if known) upon whose telephone line the device is to be
installed,
- the person (if known) who is the subject of the criminal investigation,
- the telephone number, (if known) the location of the line to which the
device is to be attached, and geographical range of the device,
- a description of the crime to which the investigation relates; 
• upon request, direct carrier assistance pursuant to section 3124;112 
• terminate within 60 days, unless extended; 
• impose necessary nondisclosure requirements, 18 U.S.C. 3123.113  
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the information likely to be obtained by such installation and use is relevant to an ongoing
criminal investigation.
“(b) Contents of order – An order issued under this section – (1) shall specify – (A) the
identity, if known, of the person to whom is leased or in whose name is listed the telephone
line to which the pen register or trap and trace device is to be attached; (B) the identity, if
known, of the person who is the subject of the criminal investigation; (C) the number and, if
known, physical location of the telephone line to which the pen register or trap and trace
device is to be attached and, in the case of a trap and trace device, the geographic limits of the
trap and trace order; and (D) a statement of the offense to which the information likely to be
obtained by the pen register or trap and trace device relates; and (2) shall direct, upon the
request of the applicant, the furnishing of information, facilities, and technical assistance
necessary to accomplish the installation of the pen register or trap and trace device under
section 3124 of this title.
“(c) Time period and extensions – (1) An order issued under this section shall authorize
the installation and use of a pen register or a trap and trace device for a period not to exceed
sixty days. (2) Extensions of such an order may be granted, but only upon an application for
an order under section 3122 of this title and upon the judicial finding required by subsection
(a) of this section.  The period of extension shall be for a period not to exceed sixty days.
“(d) Nondisclosure of existence of pen register or a trap and trace device – An order
authorizing or approving the installation and use of a pen register or a trap and trace device
shall direct that – (1) the order be sealed until otherwise ordered by the court; and (2) the
person owning or leasing the line to which the pen register or a trap and trace device is
attached, or who has been ordered by the court to provide assistance to the applicant, not
disclose the existence of the pen register or trap and trace device or the existence of the
investigation to the listed subscriber, or to any other person, unless or until otherwise ordered
by the court, 18 U.S.C. 3123.
114  “(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, any investigative or law
enforcement officer, specially designated by the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney
General, the Associate Attorney General, any Assistant Attorney General, any acting
Assistant Attorney General, or any Deputy Assistant Attorney General, or by the principal
prosecuting attorney of any State or subdivision thereof acting pursuant to a statute of that
State, who reasonably determines that – (1) an emergency situation exists that involves – (A)
immediate danger of death or serious bodily injury to any person; or (B) conspiratorial
activities characteristic of organized crime, that requires the installation and use of a pen
register or a trap and trace device before an order authorizing such installation and use can,
with due diligence, be obtained, and (2) there are grounds upon which an order could be
entered under this chapter to authorize such installation and use; may have installed and use
a pen register or trap and trace device if, within forty-eight hours after the installation has
occurred, or begins to occur, an order approving the installation or use is issued in accordance
with section 3123 of this title.
“(b) In the absence of an authorizing order, such use shall immediately terminate when
the information sought is obtained, when the application for the order is denied or when
forty-eight hours have lapsed since the installation of the pen register or trap and trace device,
whichever is earlier.
“(c) The knowing installation or use by any investigative or law enforcement officer of
(continued...)
Senior Justice Department or state prosecutors may approve the installation and
use of a pen register or trap and trace device prior to the issuance of court
authorization in emergency cases that involving either an organized crime conspiracy
or an immediate danger of death or serious injury, 18 U.S.C. 3125.114 
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a pen register or trap and trace device pursuant to subsection (a) without application for the
authorizing order within forty-eight hours of the installation shall constitute a violation of this
chapter.
“(d) A provider of a wire or electronic service, landlord, custodian, or other person who
furnished facilities or technical assistance pursuant to this section shall be reasonably
compensated for such reasonable expenses incurred in providing such facilities and
assistance,” 18 U.S.C. 3125.
115  See generally, Bazan, The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: An Overview of the
Statutory Framework for Electronic Surveillance, CRS REP.NO. RL30465 (May 17, 2000).
116  “(a) Court to hear applications and grant orders; record of denial; transmittal to court of
review – The Chief Justice of the United States shall publicly designate seven district court
judges from seven of the United States judicial circuits who shall constitute a court which
shall have jurisdiction to hear applications for and grant orders approving electronic
surveillance anywhere within the United States under the procedures set forth in this chapter,
except that no judge designated under this subsection shall hear the same application for
electronic surveillance under this chapter which has been denied previously by another judge
designated under this subsection.  If any judge so designated denies an application for an order
authorizing electronic surveillance under this chapter, such judge shall provide immediately
for the record a written statement of each reason for his decision and, on motion of the United
States, the record shall be transmitted, under seal, to the court of review established in
subsection (b) of this section transmitted under seal, to the court of review established in
subsection (b) of this section.
“(b) Court of review; record, transmittal to Supreme Court – The Chief Justice shall
publicly designate three judges, one of whom shall be publicly designated as the presiding
judge, from the United States district courts or courts of appeals who together shall comprise
a court of review which shall have jurisdiction to review the denial of any application made
under this chapter.  If such court determines that the application was properly denied, the
court shall immediately provide for the record a written statement of each reason for its
decision and, on petition of the United States for a writ of certiorari, the record shall be
transmitted under seal to the Supreme Court, which shall have jurisdiction to review such
decision.
*     *     *
“(d) Tenure – Each judge designated under this section shall so serve for a maximum
of seven years and shall not be eligible for redesignation, except that the judges first
designated under subsection (a) of this section shall be designated for terms of from one to
(continued...)
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
The approval procedure under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA),
50 U.S.C. 1801-1811, is the most distinctive of the wiretap-related procedures.115
First, it’s focus is different.  It is designed to secure foreign intelligence information
not evidence of a crime.  Second, it operates in a highly secretive manner.  But its
most individualistic feature is that the procedure is conducted entirely before an
independent court convened for no other purpose.
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court is comprised of seven federal court
judges designated by the Chief Justice to sit on the Court for a single seven year term,
50 U.S.C. 1803(a),(b),(d).116  The judges of the Court individually receive and
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seven years so that one term expires each year, and that judges first designated under
subsection (b) of this section shall be designated for terms of three, five, and seven years,” 50
U.S.C. 1803(a),(b),(d).
117  “<Electronic surveillance,’  means –
“(1) the acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device of the
contents of any wire or radio communication sent by or intended to be received by a
particular, known United States person who is in the United States, if the contents are
acquired by intentionally targeting that United States person, under circumstances in which
a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for law
enforcement purposes;
“(2) the acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device of the
contents of any wire communication to or from a person in the United States, without the
consent of any party thereto, if such acquisition occurs in the United States;
“(3) the intentional acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device
of the contents of any radio communication, under circumstances in which a person has a
reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for law enforcement
purposes, and if both the sender and all intended recipients are located within the United
States; or
“(4) the installation or use of an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device in
the United States for monitoring to acquire information, other than from a wire or radio
communication, under circumstances in which a person has a reasonable expectation of
privacy and a warrant would be required for law enforcement purposes,” 50 U.S.C. 1801(f).
The courts have noted that, unlike surveillance under Title III/EPCA, silent video
surveillance falls within the purview of FISA by virtue of subsection 1801(1)(4), United
States v. Koyomejian, 970 F.2d 536, 540 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Mesa-Rincon, 911
F.2d 1433, 1438 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Biasucci, 786 F.2d 504, 508 (2d Cir.
1986).
118  “<Foreign power’ means – (1) a foreign government or any component thereof, whether
or not recognized by the United States; (2) a faction of a foreign nation or nations, not
substantially composed of United States persons; (3) an entity that is openly acknowledged
by a foreign government or governments to be directed and controlled by such foreign
government or governments; (4) a group engaged in international terrorism or activities in
preparation therefor; (5) a foreign-based political organization, not substantially composed
of United States persons; or (6) an entity that is directed and controlled by a foreign
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approve or reject requests, authorized by the Attorney General, to conduct four
specific types of wiretapping or electronic eavesdropping (electronic surveillance)117
in order to intercept the communications of foreign powers.                                   
                                                                                                          
The contents of FISA application include:
• the identity of the individual submitting the application;
• an indication of the President’s grant of authority and the approval of the
Attorney General or a Deputy Attorney General;
• the identity or a description of the person whose communications are to be
intercepted;
• an indication of 





“<Agent of a foreign power’ means – (1) any person other than a United States person,
who – (A) acts in the United States as an officer or employee of a foreign power, or as a
member of a foreign power as defined in subsection (a)(4) of this section; (B) acts for or on
behalf of a foreign power which engages in clandestine intelligence activities in the United
States contrary to the interests of the United States, when the circumstances of such person’s
presence in the United States indicate that such person may engage in such activities in the
United States, or when such person knowingly aids or abets any person in the conduct of such
activities or knowingly conspires with any person to engage in such activities; or (2) any
person who – (A) knowingly engages in clandestine intelligence gathering activities for or on
behalf of a foreign power, which activities involve or may involve a violation of the criminal
statutes of the United States; (B) pursuant to the direction of an intelligence service or network
of a foreign power, knowingly engages in any other clandestine intelligence activities for or
on behalf of such foreign power, which activities involve or are about to involve a violation
of the criminal statutes of the United States; (C) knowingly engages in sabotage or
international terrorism, or activities that are in preparation therefor, or on behalf of a foreign
power; or (D) knowingly aids or abets any person in the conduct of activities described in
subparagraph (A), (B), or (C) or knowingly conspires with any person to engage in activities
described in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C),” 50 U.S.C. 1801(a),(b). 
Note that the definition of foreign power includes international terrorists groups
regardless of whether any nexus to a foreign power can be shown, 50 U.S.C. 1801(a)(4) and
includes agents of foreign powers that no longer exist, United States v. Squillacote, 221 F.3d
542, 554 (4th Cir. 2000)(agents of East Germany intercepted under an order granted after
unification). 
119 “<Minimization procedures’, with respect to electronic surveillance, means – (1) specific
procedures, which shall be adopted by the Attorney General, that are reasonably designed in
light of the purpose and technique of the particular surveillance, to minimize the acquisition
and retention, and prohibit the dissemination, of nonpublicly available information concerning
unconsenting United States persons consistent with the need of the United States to obtain,
produce, and disseminate foreign intelligence information;
“(2) procedures that require that nonpublicly available information, which is not foreign
intelligence information, as defined in subsection (e)(1) of this section, shall not be
disseminated in a manner that identifies any United States person, without such person’s
consent, unless such person’s identity is necessary to understand foreign intelligence
information or assess its importance;
“(3) notwithstanding paragraphs (1) and (2), procedures that allow for the retention and
dissemination of information that is evidence of a crime which has been, is being, or is about
to be committed and that is to be retained or disseminated for law enforcement purposes; and
“(4) notwithstanding paragraphs (1), (2), and (3), with respect to any electronic
surveillance approved pursuant to section 1802(a) of this title, procedures that require that no
contents of any communication to which a United States person is a party shall be disclosed,
disseminated, or used for any purpose or retained for longer than twenty-four hours unless a
court order under section 1805 of this title is obtained or unless the Attorney General
determines that the information indicates a threat of death or serious bodily harm to any
person,” 50 U.S.C. 1801(h).
-  why foreign powers or their agents are believed to use the targeted
facilities or places;
• a summary of the minimization procedures119 to be followed;
• a detailed description of the communications to be intercepted and the
information sought (only if the target is a foreign agent; if the target is a foreign
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120  “Upon an application made pursuant to section 1804 of this title, the judge shall enter an
ex parte order as requested or as modified approving the electronic surveillance if he finds that
– (1) the President has authorized the Attorney General to approve applications for electronic
surveillance for foreign intelligence information; (2) the application has been made by a
Federal officer and approved by the Attorney General; (3) on the basis of the facts submitted
by the applicant there is probable cause to believe that – (A) the target of the electronic
surveillance is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power:  Provided, That no United
States person may be considered a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power solely upon
the basis of activities protected by the first amendment to the Constitution of the United
States; and (B) each of the facilities or places at which the electronic surveillance is directed
(continued...)
power, an indication of the communications of and information about Americans
likely to be intercepted);
• certification by a senior national security or senior defense adviser to the
President that
- the information sought is foreign intelligence information,
- purpose of interception is to secure foreign intelligence information,
- the information cannot reasonably be obtained using alternative means
(including a statement of the basis for the belief if the target is a foreign agent;
if the target is a foreign power, an indication of the communications of and
information about Americans likely to be intercepted),
- an indication (including a statement of the basis for the belief if the target
is a foreign agent; if the target is a foreign power, the extent to which the
communications of and information about Americans are likely to be intercepted)
of whether the information relates to
+ an actual or potential foreign attack or other grave hostile act,
+ sabotage or terrorism by a foreign power or its agents, or
+ foreign clandestine intelligence activities,
• the means of accomplishing the interception (including whether a physical entry
will be required)(only if the target is a foreign agent; if the target is a foreign
power, an indication of the communications of and information about Americans
likely to be intercepted);
• a history of past interception applications involving the same persons, places
or facilities;
• the period of time during which the interception is to occur, whether it will
terminate immediately upon obtaining the information sought, and if not, the
reasons why interception thereafter is likely to be productive; 
• whether more than one interception device is to be used and if so their range
and the minimization procedures associated with each (only if the target is a
foreign agent; if the target is a foreign power, an indication of the
communications of and information about Americans likely to be intercepted);
and
• any other information the judge requests, 50 U.S.C. 1804.
FISA court judges issue orders approving electronic surveillance upon a finding
that the application requirements have been met and that there is probable cause to
believe that the target of the interceptions is a foreign power or the agent of a foreign




is being used, or is about to be used, by a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power; (4)
the proposed minimization procedures meet the definition of minimization procedures under
section 1801(h) of this title; and (5) the application which has been filed contains all
statements and certifications required by section 1804 of this title and, if the target is a United
States person, the certification or certifications are not clearly erroneous on the basis of the
statement made under section 1804(a)(7)(E) of this title and any other information furnished
under section 1804(d) of this title,” 50 U.S.C. 1805(a).
121  “Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, when the Attorney General
reasonably determines that – (1) an emergency situation exists with respect to the employment
of electronic surveillance to obtain foreign intelligence information before an order authorizing
such surveillance can with due diligence be obtained; and (2) the factual basis for issuance of
an order under this subchapter to approve such surveillance exists – he may authorize the
emergency employment of electronic surveillance if a judge having jurisdiction under section
1803 of this title is informed by the Attorney General or his designee at the time of such
authorization that the decision has been made to employ emergency electronic surveillance and
if an application in accordance with this subchapter is made to that judge as soon as
practicable, but not more than twenty-four hours after the Attorney General authorizes such
surveillance.  If the Attorney General authorizes such emergency employment of electronic
surveillance, he shall require that the minimization procedures required by this subchapter for
the issuance of a judicial order be followed.  In the absence of a judicial order approving such
electronic surveillance, the surveillance shall terminate when the information sought is
obtained, when the application for the order is denied, or after the expiration of twenty-four
hours from the time of authorization by the Attorney General, whichever is earliest. In the
event that such application for approval is denied, or in any other case where the electronic
surveillance is terminated and no order is issued approving the surveillance, no information
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Orders approving electronic surveillance must:
• specify
- the identity or a description of the person whose communications are to
be intercepted,
- the nature and location of the targeted facilities or places,
- type of communications or activities targeted and the kind of information
sought (if the target is a foreign agent),
- the means by which interception is to be accomplished and whether
physical entry is authorized (if the target is a foreign agent),
- the tenure of the authorization, and
- whether more than one device are to be used and if so their respective
ranges and associated minimization procedures (if the target is a foreign agent);
• require
- that minimization procedures be adhered to,
- upon request, that carriers and others provide assistance,
- that those providing assistance observe certain security precautions, and
be compensated;
• expire when its purpose is accomplished but not later than after 90 days unless
extended (extensions may not exceed 1 year), 50 U.S.C. 1805(b),(c), (d).
As in the case of law enforcement wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping,
there is authority for interception prior to approval in emergency situations, 50 U.S.C.
1805(e),121  but there is also statutory authority for foreign intelligence surveillance
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obtained or evidence derived from such surveillance shall be received in evidence or otherwise
disclosed in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court, grand jury,
department, office, agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority of the
United States, a State, or political subdivision thereof, and no information concerning any
United States person acquired from such surveillance shall subsequently be used or disclosed
in any other manner by Federal officers or employees without the consent of such person,
except with the approval of the Attorney General if the information indicates a threat of death
or serious bodily harm to any person.  A denial of the application made under this subsection
may be reviewed as provided in section 1803 of this title,” 50 U.S.C. 1805(e).
122  “(1) Notwithstanding any other law, the President, through the Attorney General, may
authorize electronic surveillance without a court order under this subchapter to acquire foreign
intelligence information for periods of up to one year if the Attorney General certifies in
writing under oath that – (A) the electronic surveillance is solely directed at – (i) the
acquisition of the contents of communications transmitted by means of communications used
exclusively between or among foreign powers, as defined in section 1801(a)(1), (2), or (3) of
this title; or (ii) the acquisition of technical intelligence, other than the spoken communications
of individuals, from property or premises under the open and exclusive control of a foreign
power, as defined in section 1801(a)(1), (2), or (3) of this title; (B) there is no substantial
likelihood that the surveillance will acquire the contents of any communication to which a
United States person is a party; and (C) the proposed minimization procedures with respect
to such surveillance meet the definition of minimization procedures under section 1801(h) of
this title; and – if the Attorney General reports such minimization procedures and any changes
thereto to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence at least thirty days prior to their effective date, unless the Attorney
General determines immediate action is required and notifies the committees immediately of
such minimization procedures and the reason for their becoming effective immediately. . . .
“(4) With respect to electronic surveillance authorized by this subsection, the Attorney
General may direct a specified communication common carrier to -- (A) furnish all
information, facilities, or technical assistance necessary to accomplish the electronic
surveillance in such a manner as will protect its secrecy and produce a minimum of
interference with the services that such carrier is providing its customers; and (B) maintain
under security procedures approved by the Attorney General and the Director of Central
Intelligence any records concerning the surveillance or the aid furnished which such carrier
wishes to retain – The Government shall compensate, at the prevailing rate, such carrier for
furnishing such aid,” 50 U.S.C. 1802(a)(1),(4).
123“(2) An electronic surveillance authorized by this subsection may be conducted only in
accordance with the Attorney General’s certification and the minimization procedures adopted
by him.  The Attorney General shall assess compliance with such procedures and shall report
such assessments to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence under the provisions of section 1808(a) of this title.
“(3) The Attorney General shall immediately transmit under seal to the court established
under section 1803(a) of this title a copy of his certification.  Such certification shall be
maintained under security measures established by the Chief Justice with the concurrence of
the Attorney General, in consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence, and shall
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interceptions without the requirement of a court order when the targets are limited to
communications among or between foreign powers or involve nonverbal
communications from places under the open and exclusive control of a foreign power,
50 U.S.C. 1802(a)(1),(4).122  The second of these is replete with reporting
requirements to Congress and the FISA court, 50 U.S.C. 1802(a)(2),(3),123 and both
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remain sealed unless – (A) an application for a court order with respect to the surveillance is
made under sections 1801(h)(4) and 1804 of this title; or (B) the certification is necessary to
determine the legality of the surveillance under section 1806(f) of this title,” 50 U.S.C.
1802(a)(2),(3).
124  United States v. Bin Laden, 126 F.Supp.2d 264, 281-82 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)(overseas
surveillance of an American (who was an international terrorist) found contrary to Fourth
Amendment requirements).  United States v. United States District Court (Keith), 407 U.S.
297, 321-22 (1972), held that the Fourth Amendment does not permit warrantless electronic
surveillance of domestic terrorists, but left open “the issues which may be involved with
respect to activities of foreign powers or their agents.”
125   “In a cellular radiotelephone system, large service areas are divided into honeycomb-
shaped segments or <cells,’  each of which is equipped with a low-power transmitter or base
station which can receive and radiate messages within its parameters.  When a caller dials a
number on a cellular telephone, a transreceiver sends signals over the air on a radio frequency
to a cell site.  From there the signal travels over phone lines or a microwave to a computerized
mobile telephone switching office (“MTSO”) or station.  The MTSO automatically and
inaudibly switches the conversation from one base station and one frequency to another as the
portable telephone, typically in a motor vehicle, moves from cell to cell.”  S.REP.NO. 541,
99th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1986).
126  Cellular telephone service uses both radio and wire transmissions.
127  The House Judiciary Committee Report stated, “Existing law, which prohibits interception
of wire communications or oral communications, was enacted prior to the development of
cellular telecommunications and does not provide adequate privacy protection to conversations
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may be subject to constitutional limitations, particularly when Americans are the
surveillance targets.124                                                                                             
                                                
ISSUES NO LONGER QUITE SO NETTLESOME
Cell Phones
Cellular telephone conversations are now clearly protected by Title III/EPCA.
Cellular telephone service125 was approved by the Federal Communications
Commission in 1981.  Title III was initially enacted prior to the development of
cellular telecommunications.  Explicit privacy protection for cellular communications
was among the several modifications ECPA brought to Title III.  ECPA expanded
Title III’s definition of “wire communication” to include communications made over
cellular systems so long as the connection between the sending and receiving phones
is made in a switching station.126
  
     In drafting  ECPA Congress was concerned that “[c]ellular telephone calls can be
intercepted by either sophisticated scanners designed for that purpose, or by regular
radio scanners modified to intercept cellular calls,” S.REP.NO. 541, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. 9 (1986).  Although the interception of cellular telephone calls was illegal under




transmitted over a cellular system. . . .  Inasmuch as all cellular communications (whether
mobile-to-mobile or mobile-to-landline) must pass through a mobile telephone switching
office, the Committee bill will remedy this inadequacy and provide explicit privacy protection
to all communications utilizing cellular radio. . . .”   H.REP.NO. 647, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 31
(1986).
128  “(b) If the offense is a first offense under paragraph (a) of this subsection and is not for
a tortious or illegal purpose or for purposes of direct or indirect commercial advantage or
private commercial gain, and the wire or electronic communication with respect to which the
offense under paragraph (a) is a radio communication that is not scrambled, encrypted, or
transmitted using modulation techniques the essential parameters of which have been withheld
from the public with the intention of preserving the privacy of such communication then – (i)
if the communication is not the radio portion of a cellular telephone communication, . . . , the
offender shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and (ii)
if the communication is the radio portion of a cellular telephone communication, . . . , the
offender shall be fined under this title.” 18 U.S.C. 2511(4)(b).
129  Section 2511(a) of title 18, U.S.C., specifies imprisonment of up to 5 years, and thereby
incorporates by reference 18 U.S.C. § 3559, making the offense a Class D felony, which is,
thus, subject to a fine of up to $250,000 for individuals, and organizations up to $500,000
under 18 U.S.C. § 3571.
130  Section 2511(4)(b)(i) of title 18, U.S.C., specifies imprisonment of up to 1 year, and
thereby incorporates by reference 18 U.S.C. § 3559, making the offense a misdemeanor,
which is, thus, subject to a fine of up to $100,000, under 18 U.S.C. § 3571.
Part of the impetus for Congressional action was the routine advertisement of
scanning receivers promoting eavesdropping on cellular conversations,  H.REP.NO.
647, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1986).  Although scanning enthusiasts argued before
the Judiciary Committee “that the mere monitoring of cellular telephone calls should
not be illegal,”  the Committee rejected those arguments because the 1968 wiretap
law had made the willful monitoring of such calls illegal, and because the design of the
cellular telephone system makes the intentional monitoring of specific calls more
difficult, H.REP.NO. 647, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8 (1986).
Title III/ECPA makes it a crime and a civil offense to intercept and disclose
intercepted cellular communication.  Subject to certain exceptions,128 the general rule
is that an individual found guilty of violating section 2511 will be liable for a fine up
to $250,000 and imprisonment of up to five years or both, 18 U.S.C. 2511(4)(a).129
Exceptions to the general rule were enacted for radio communications on the theory
that it is easier to inadvertently intercept certain types of radio communications. 
 
“The first exception for this general rule is that interception of [private] radio
communications [that are not scrambled, encrypted, or transmitted using private
modulation techniques] are punishable as one year misdemeanors with fines up to
$100,000 . . . .” H.REP.NO. 647, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1986).  A person found
guilty of intercepting private radio communications will be liable for a fine up to
$100,000 under Title 18 and imprisonment of up to one year or both.130  “If the
offender has been previously found to have been guilty of an offense of intercepting
radio communications, then the felony provisions apply.  Similarly, if the interception
is done for illegal, tortious or commercial gain purposes, then the offender is
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131  Section 2511(4)(b)(ii) of title 18, U.S.C., specifies no term of imprisonment, and thereby
incorporates by reference 18 U.S.C. § 3559, making the offense an infraction, which is, thus,
subject to a fine of up to $5,000, under 18 U.S.C. § 3571.
132  The standards must (1) meet the assistance capability requirements by cost-effective
methods; (2) protect the privacy and security of communications not authorized to be
intercepted; (3) minimize the cost of such compliance on residential ratepayers; (4) serve the
policy of the United States to encourage provision of new technologies and services; and (5)
provide reasonable time and conditions for compliance with, and transition to, the new
standard, 47 U.S.C. 1006.
133  The punch list consists of the ability to capture: “1) Content of subject-initiated conference
calls . . . .2) Party hold, join, drop – Messages would be sent to law enforcement that identify
the active parties of a call.  Specifically, on a conference call, those messages would indicate
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punishable under the felony penalty,” H.REP.NO. 647, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 47
(1986).
Under section 2511(4)(b)(ii) “. . . [f]irst offenders who intercept the radio
portion of a cellular telephone call (and who act without one of the enumerated bad
purposes) may be subject up to a $5,000 fine.”131  If the “offender intercepts the wire
portion of a [cellular] telephone call such conduct remains a five year felony,”
H.REP.NO. 647, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1986).
Any person whose cellular communication is unlawfully intercepted, used, or
disclosed may bring a civil action against each violator, and may recover actual
damages or liquidated damages of $10,000,  18 U.S.C. § 2520.
CALEA
Communications carriers are obliged to assist law enforcement officials conduct
court-ordered wiretaps, but advances in technology have made that increasingly
difficult.  The Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 1994
(CALEA), Pub. L. No. 103-414, 108 Stat. 4279 (1994), 47 U.S.C. 1001-1010, seeks
to preserve the capability of law enforcement agencies to carry out properly
authorized intercepts by requiring telecommunications carriers to modify and design
their equipment, facilities, and services to ensure that authorized electronic
eavesdropping can be performed.
Subject to regulatory review by the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC), the carriers were responsible for the initial development of technical standards
to fulfill their surveillance capability responsibilities under CALEA.132  Following
release of the industry group’s proposed standard (the so-call J-Standard, officially
the Interim Standard/Trial Standard J-STD-025), the Center for Democracy and
Technology appealed to the FCC claiming the J-Standard violated CALEA’s privacy
protections and impermissibly expanded government surveillance capabilities.  The
Justice Department and the FBI also petitioned the Commission for modifications,
arguing that the J-Standard did not include all of CALEA’s required assistance
capabilities.  The Department sought a list of nine additional surveillance capabilities,
its so-called punch list.133  After receiving public comment on the petitions, the FCC
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whether a party is on hold, has joined or has been dropped from the conference call. 3)
Subject-initiated dialing and signaling information . . . . 4) In-band and out-of-band signaling
(notification message) – A message would be sent to [law enforcement officers] whenever a
subject’s service sends a tone or other network message to the subject or association (e.g.,
notification that a line is ringing or busy). 5) Timing information – Information necessary to
correlate call-identifying information with the call content of a communications interception
. . . . 6) Surveillance status – a message that would verify that an interception is still
functioning . . . . 7) Continuity check tone (c-tone) – An electronic signal that would alter
[law enforcement officials] if the facility used for delivery of call content interception has
failed or lost continuity.  8) Feature status – A message would affirmatively notify [law
enforcement officials] of any changes in features to which a subject subscribes. 9) Dialed digit
extraction – Information sent to [law enforcement officials] would include those digits dialed
by a subject after initial call setup is completed,” In re Communications Assistance for Law
Enforcement Act, 14 F.C.C.R. 16794, 16798-799 (1999).
134 In digital switching, a communication is broken into a number of digital packets, each
traveling independently.  Data packets are reassembled at their final destination.  Each packet
contains two components: a portion of the communications message and an address.  The
address information appears in the packet’s header.  The message within the packet is known
as the “body” or “payload.” The J-Standard requires that carriers make available both header
and payload data.  The petitioners claimed that packet headers (communication-identifying
information) cannot be separated from bodies (communications content), and that any packet-
mode data made available to law enforcement pursuant to a pen register order would include
some call content, thereby violating CALEA’s privacy protections. 
The antenna tower location information capability requires carries to make available the
physical location of the antenna tower that a mobile phone uses to connect at the beginning
and end of a call.
resolved the challenges to the J-Standard in its Third Report & Order,  In re Matter
of Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, 14 F.C.C.R. 16794 (1999).
The United States Telecom Association, the Cellular Telecommunications
Industry Association, the Center for Democracy and Technology and several other
privacy grounds challenged the FCC order in the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia.  The FCC and the Justice Department filed separate briefs
defending the Commission’s action.  The challengers questioned inclusion of the six
of the law enforcement assistance capabilities which the FCC order insisted upon: two
from the J-Standard (cellular antenna tower location information and packet-mode
data)134 and four from the FBI’s punch list (dialed digit extraction, party
hold/join/drop, subject-initiated dialing and signaling, and in-band out-of-band
signaling).
On August 15, 2000, in United States Telecom Ass’n v. FCC,, 227 F.3d 450
(D.C.Cir. 2000), the court of appeals vacated the order and sent back to the FCC that
portion of the Commission’s order dealing with the four challenged punish list items,




135  “Encryption basically involves running a readable message known as <plaintext’ through
a computer program that translates the message according to an equation or algorithm into
unreadable <ciphertext.’  Decryption is the translation back to plaintext when the message is
received by someone with an appropriate <key,’” Bernstein v. United States Department of
State, 945 F.Supp. 1279, 1282 (N.D.Cal. 1996); see also, H.R.Rep.No. 105-108 (Pt.1) at 5
(1997); H.R.Rep.No. 105-108 (Pt.2) at 4-5 (1997); Froomkin, The Metaphor Is the Key:
Cryptography, the Clipper Chip, and the Constitution, 143 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA
LAW REVIEW 709, 714 (1995).
As a general rule, encryption has a broader meaning; it is a form of cryptography, a
form of “secret writing” or “hidden writing” or – perhaps closest to its Greek derivation –
“buried writing.”  Writing in code is a practice of ancient origin employed by Julius Caesar,
Leonardo daVinci, and Thomas Jefferson among others.  In more modern times, it has
provided both juvenile amusement (“Captain Midnight’s Magic Decoder Ring”) and important
military and diplomatic uses (code breaking played an important part in Allied success in
World War II perhaps most famously at the Battle of Midway and in the battle for the Atlantic
against German U-boats).  For a historical examination of the practice see, KAHN, THE
CODEBREAKERS (1967); for a more technical introduction to the art and science of
cryptography, see, KONHEIM, CRYPTOGRAPHY: A PRIMER (1981); MEYER & MATYAS,
CRYPTOGRAPHY: A NEW DIMENSION IN COMPUTER DATA SECURITY (1982).
136  “If unbreakable encryption proliferates, critical law enforcement tools would be nullified.
For example, even if the Government satisfies the rigorous legal and procedural requirements
for obtaining an order to tap the phones of drug traffickers, the wiretap would be worthless
if the intercepted communications amount to an unintelligible jumble of noises or symbols.
Or we might legally seize the computer of terrorist or a child molester using the Internet and
be unable to read the data identifying his targets or his plans,”  Security and Freedom
Through Encryption (SAFE) Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual
Property of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1997) (testimony
Deputy Ass’t Att’y Gen. Robert S. Litt). See also, The Administration’s Clipper Chip Key
Escrow Encryption Program: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Technology and the Law of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1994)((testimony of Ass’t
Att’y Gen. Jo Ann Harris)(“if intercepted criminal conversations are encrypted, we need the
ability to cut through the encryption, just as we need a translator to cut through the foreign
language. . . . [H]igh-quality voice encryption in an affordable, portable easy to use for will
soon be widely available on the market. . . . We worry . . . that such devices will also be used
by criminal organizations to shield their illegal enterprises”);  Encryption and Computer
Privacy: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997)
(FBI Director Louis Freeh) (“If we have access per court order to the conversation of someone
who has committed a crime or is about to commit a heinous crime, whether it be an act of
terrorism or kidnapping, and the federal, state, and local officers who are listening to that
court-authorized conversation or looking for the data which is stored somewhere can’t
understand it, the access really is not meaningful. If we have all the legal authorities and the
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Encryption is a means of protecting any computer-related communication from
wiretapping or interception.  It scrambles information generated by computer, stored
in a computer, or transmitted through a computer so that the information can only be
retrieved in an intelligible form by someone with the key to unscramble it.135
Encryption is important for the protection of government, commercial, and
private information and communications, but over the last several years, police and
intelligence authorities have expressed growing concerns that unregulated access to,
and use of, encryption might have unfortunate consequences.136
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technical accessibility to that information but we can’t understand it in real-time, it doesn’t
do us and the people that we have to protect and the country very much good.”).
137  The federal government was instrumental in creation of the most common used encryption
algorithm, the 56-bit Digital Encryption Standard (DES), its interim replacement the triple-
DES, and finally the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) 256-bit Rijndael algorithm. 64
Fed.Reg.60424 (Nov.5, 1999); 66 Fed.Reg. 12762  (Feb. 28, 2001); see generally, Taking
Account of the World As It Will Be: The Shifting Course of U.S. Encryption Policy, 53
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL 289 (2001) (The terms “56-bit” or “256-bit”
means that the keys required to unlock information encrypted by the software may be no more
than 56 or 256 binary digits long, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, CRYPTOGRAPHY’S ROLE
IN SECURING THE INFORMATION SOCIETY, Glossary B (Prepublication Copy) (May 30,
1996)).
138  Encryption products were subject to export restrictions whose generosity depended upon
the strength of the encryption and the receptivity of their exporters to a “key recovery” system.
The International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) authorizes the President to
regulate certain import and export activities, 50 U.S.C. 1702, in order to deal with “unusual
and extraordinary threat[s] . . . to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the
United States,” 50 U.S.C. 1701.  The President relied upon these powers, E.O. 12131 (as
amended, 50 U.S.C. 1701 note), to revive otherwise expired portions of the Export
Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. App. 2401 to 2410c, and regulations promulgated
thereunder. Pursuant to these powers he authorized the Department of Commerce to
promulgate regulations for the issuance of the necessary export licenses covering encryption
products, E.O. 13026, 61 Fed.Reg. 58767 (Nov. 19, 1996).  The Department of Commerce
issued interim encryption export license regulations, 61 Fed.Reg. 68572 (Dec. 30, 1996)(date
omitted hereafter).
Violations of any license, order, or regulation issued under IEEPA are punishable by
civil penalties of up to $10,000 and by criminal penalties of imprisonment for not more than
10 years and/or a fine of not more than $50,000, 50 U.S.C. 1705.  Encryption software and
equipment could not be exported without a license.  15 C.F.R. 736.2(7), 61 Fed.Reg. 68579
(Dec. 30, 1996).  Certain “cryptographic equipment specially designed and limited or use in
machines for banking . . . transactions” was not controlled by these restrictions, 15 C.F.R.
Supplement No.1 to part 774, 61 Fed.Reg. 68586.   Export licenses for 40-bit mass-market
encryption software were issued subject to a one-time expedited review process.  15 C.F.R.
(continued...)
The difficult question is how best to ensure the benefits of encryption while
avoiding the dangers it might also bring.  Law enforcement officials and others have
argued that the proper equation consists of four elements: (1) strong encryption
available to protect governmental, business and private information; (2) criminal laws
outlawing the use of encryption in furtherance of greater crimes or perhaps even more
broadly; (3) a key recovery feature in all encryption that allows the encrypted affairs
of terrorists and other criminals to be unlocked; and (4) development of a profession
of trusted custodians for those keys (sometimes referred to as a key escrow or key
management infrastructure).
Reaction to their proposals has thus far been mixed.  The federal government has
been a major contributor to the development of stronger encryption.137  Although it
enacted no new criminal penalties for the criminal use of encryption, for several years
the federal government greatly restricted exports of encryption technology backed by
the threat of criminal penalties.138  The restrictions, however, have been substantially
CRS-58
138(...continued)
742.15 (61 Fed.Reg. 68581) and Supplement No.6 to Pt.742 (61 Fed.Reg. 68583-584).
Export licenses for 56-bit encryption software were issued for software that contained key
escrow, key recovery or key recoverable features or for 56-bit software without such features
but whose producers submitted a detailed plan for the steps to be taken before January 1,
1999  for the creation of 56-bit software with such features. 15 C.F.R. 742.15 (61 Fed.Reg.
68581-582) and Supplements 4, 5 & 7 to Pt.742 (61 Fed.Reg. 68582-584).  “Key escrow,”
“key recovery,” and “key recoverable” all refer to features where a “key” that will unlock
encrypted information is held by the manufacturer of the encryption product or some other
individual or entity from whom it may be obtained by authorities, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY
ASSESSMENT, ISSUE UPDATE OF INFORMATION SECURITY AND PRIVACY IN NETWORK
ENVIRONMENTS, 6 (June, 1995); Supplemental Information, 61 Fed.Reg. 68575 (“For
purposes of this rule, <recovery encryption products’ refers to products (including software)
that allow government officials to obtain under proper legal authority and without the
cooperation or knowledge of the user, the plaintext of encrypted data and communications”).
Prior to the invocation the President’s authority under IEEPA, the Arms Export Control
Act,  22 U.S.C. 2751 to 2596. and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations, 22 C.F.R.
120-130 (rev. as of April 1, 1996), had been used for some time to restrict encryption exports.
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, CRYPTOGRAPHY’S ROLE IN SECURING THE INFORMATION
SOCIETY, A Brief History of Cryptography Policy (Prepublication Copy) (May 30, 1996);
Public Cryptography, Arms Export Controls, and the First Amendment: A Need for
Legislation, 17 CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 197 (1994); Cryptography, Export
Controls, and the First Amendment in Bernstein v. United States Department of State, 10
HARVARD JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY 667 (1997).  Effective enforcement of the
export restrictions, however, posed certain First Amendment complications, Constitutional
Law–Free Speech Clause–Sixth Circuit Classifies Computer Source Code as Protected
Speech – Junger v. Daley, 209 F.3d 481 (6th Cir. 2000), 114 HARVARD LAW REVIEW 1813
(2001).
139  65 Fed.Reg. 2492 (Jan.14, 2000); 65 Fed.Reg. 62600 (Oct. 19, 2000), discussed in,
Grimmett, Encryption Export Controls, CRS REP.NO. RL30273 (Jan. 11, 2001).
reduced recently, particular with respect to exports to the European Union and




State Statutes Outlawing the Interception
of Wire(w), Oral(o) and Electronic Communications(e) 
Alabama: Ala.Code §§13A-11-30 to 13A-11-37(w/o);
Alaska: Alaska Stat. §§42.20.300 to 42.20.390(w/o/e); 
Arizona: Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. §§13-3001 to 13-3009(w/o/e);
Arkansas: Ark.Code §5-60-120(w/o/e);
California: Cal.Penal Code §§631(w), 632(o), 632.7(e);
Colorado: Colo.Rev.Stat. §§18-9-301 to 18-9-305(w/o/e);
Connecticut: Conn.Gen.Stat.Ann. §§53a-187 to 53a-
189(w/o);
Delaware: Del.Code tit.11 §2402(w/o/e);
Florida: Fla.Stat.Ann. §934.03(w/o/e);
Georgia: Ga.Code §16-11-62 (w/o/e);
Hawaii: Hawaii Rev.Stat. §§803-41, 803-42(w/o/e);
Idaho: Idaho Code §18-6702(w/o);
Illinois: Ill.Comp.Stat.Ann. ch.720 §5/14-2(w/o);
Indiana: Ind.Code Ann. §35-33.5-5-5;*
Iowa: Iowa Code Ann. §808B.2(w/o/e);




Maine: Me.Rev.Stat.Ann. ch.15 §§710(w/o);
Maryland: Md.Cts. & Jud.Pro.Code Ann. §10-402(w/o/e);





Missouri: Mo.Ann.Stat. §542.402 (w/o);
Montana: Mont.Code Ann. §45-8-213(w/o);
Nebraska: Neb.Rev.Stat. §86-702(w/o);
Nevada: Nev.Rev.Stat. §§200.620(w), 200.650(o);
New Hampshire: N.H.Rev.Stat.Ann. §570-A:2 (w/o);
New Jersey: N.J.Stat.Ann. §2A:156A-3(w/o);
New Mexico: N.M.Stat.Ann. §30-12-1(w);
New York: N.Y.Penal Law §250.05(w/o/e);
North Carolina: N.C.Gen.Stat. §15A-287(w/o/e);
North Dakota: N.D.Cent.Code §§12.1-15-02 (w/o);
Ohio: Ohio Rev.Code §2933.52 (w/o/e);
Oklahoma: Okla.Stat.Ann. tit.13 §176.3 (w/o/e);
Oregon: Ore.Rev.Stat. §§165.535 to 165.545 (w/o/e);
Pennsylvania: Pa.Stat.Ann. tit.18 §5703 (w/o/e);
Rhode Island: R.I.Gen.Laws §§11-35-21(w/o/e);
South Dakota: S.D.Cod.Laws §23A-35A-20 (w/o);
Tennessee: Tenn.Code Ann. §39-13-601(w/o/e);
Texas: Tex.Penal Code. §16.02(w/o/e);





West Virginia: W.Va.Code §62-1D-3(w/o/e);
Wisconsin: Wis.Stat.Ann. §968.31(w/o/e);
Wyoming: Wyo.Stat. §7-3-602(w/o/e);
District of Columbia: D.C.Code §23-542(w/o).
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Consent Interceptions Under State Law 
Alabama: Ala.Code §13A-11-30 (one party consent); 
Alaska: Alaska Stat. §§42.20.310, 42.20.330 (one party
consent); 
Arizona: Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. §13-3005 (one party consent);
Arkansas: Ark.Code §5-60-120 (one party consent); 
California: Cal. Penal Code §§ 631, 632 (one party consent
for police; all party consent otherwise); 
Colorado: Colo.Rev.Stat. §§18-9-303, 18-9-304 (one party
consent); 
Connecticut: Conn.Gen.Stat.Ann. §§53a-187(one party
consent); 
Delaware: Del.Code tit.11 §2402 (one party consent); 
Florida: Fla.Stat.Ann. §934.03 (one party consent for the
police, all party consent for others); 
Georgia: Ga.Code §16-11-66 (one party consent);
Hawaii: Hawaii Rev.Stat. §803-42 (one party consent); 
Idaho: Idaho Code §18-6702 (one party consent); 
Illinois: Ill.Comp.Stat.Ann. ch.720 §5/14-2 (law
enforcement exceptions but no one party consent
exception);
Indiana: Ind.Code Ann. §35-33.5-5-6 (no consent
language, but proscription is limited );
Iowa: Iowa Code Ann. §808B.2 (one party consent); 
Kansas: Kan.Stat.Ann. §§21-4001, 21-4002 (all party
consent); 
Kentucky: Ky.Rev.Stat. §526.010 (one party consent); 
Louisiana: La.Rev.Stat.Ann. §15:1303 (one party consent);
Maine: Me.Rev.Stat.Ann. ch.15 §§709, 712 (one party
consent);  
Maryland: Md.Cts. & Jud.Pro.Code Ann. §10-402 (all
party consent); 
Massachusetts: Mass.Gen.Laws Ann. ch.272 §§99 (all
parties must consent, except in some law enforcement
cases);
Michigan: Mich.Comp.Laws Ann. §750.539c
(eavesdropping proscriptions do not apply to otherwise
lawful activities of peace officers); 
Minnesota: Minn.Stat.Ann. §626A.02 (one party consent);
Mississippi: Miss.Code §41-29-531 (one party consent);
Missouri: Mo.Ann.Stat. §542.402 (one party consent);
 
Montana: Mont.Conde Ann. §§45-8-213 (all parties must
consent);
Nebraska: Neb.Rev.Stat. §86-702 (one party consent);
Nevada: Nev.Rev.Stat. §§200.620, 200.650 (one party
consent); 
New Hampshire: N.H.Rev.Stat.Ann. §570-A:2 (all party
consent); 
New Jersey: N.J.Stat.Ann. §§2A:156A-4 (one party
consent); 
New Mexico: N.M.Stat.Ann. §§30-12-1 (one party
consent); 
New York: N.Y.Penal Law §250.00 (one party consent); 
North Carolina: N.C.Gen.Stat. §15A-287 (one party
consent); 
North Dakota: N.D.Cent.Code §§12.1-15-02 (one party
consent); 
Ohio: Ohio Rev.Code §2933.52 (one party consent); 
Oklahoma: Okla.Stat.Ann. tit.13 §176.4 (one party
consent); 
Oregon: Ore.Rev.Stat. §165.540 (one party consent for
wiretapping and all parties must consent for other forms of
electronic eavesdropping);
Pennsylvania: Pa.Stat.Ann. tit.18 §5704 (one party consent
for the police; all parties consent otherwise); 
Rhode Island: R.I.Gen.Laws §§11-35-21 (one party
consent); 
South Dakota: S.D.Comp.Laws §§23A-35A-20 (one party
consent);
Tennessee: Tenn.Code Ann. §39-13-601 (one party
consent)
Texas: Tex.Penal Code §16.02 (one party consent); 
Utah: Utah Code Ann. §§77-23a-4 (one party consent);
Virginia: Va.Code §19.2-62 (one party consent);
Washington: Wash.Rev.Code Ann. §9.73.030 (all parties
must consent except in certain law enforcement cases);
West Virginia: W.Va.Code §62-1D-3 (one party consent);
Wisconsin: Wis.Stat.Ann. §968.31 (one party consent);
Wyoming: Wyo.Stat. §7-3-602 (one party consent); 




Statutory Civil Liability for Interceptions Under State Law 
Arizona: Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. §12-731;
California: Cal. Penal Code §§ 637.2;
Colorado: Colo.Rev.Stat. §18-9-309.5;
Connecticut: Conn.Gen.Stat.Ann. §54-41r;
Delaware: Del.Code tit.11 §2409;
Florida: Fla.Stat.Ann. §§934.10, 934.27;
Hawaii: Hawaii Rev.Stat. §803-48; 
Idaho: Idaho Code §18-6709;
Illinois: Ill.Comp.Stat.Ann. ch.720 §5/14-6;
Indiana: Ind.Code Ann. §35-33.5-5-4;
Iowa: Iowa Code Ann. §808B.8;
Kansas: Kan.Stat.Ann. §22-2518
Louisiana: La.Rev.Stat.Ann. §15:1312;
Maine: Me.Rev.Stat.Ann. ch.15 §711;
Maryland: Md.Cts. & Jud.Pro.Code Ann. §§10-410, 10-
4A-08;
Massachusetts: Mass.Gen.Laws Ann. ch.272 §§99;
Michigan: Mich.Comp.Laws Ann. §750.539h;
Minnesota: Minn.Stat.Ann. §§626A.02, 626A.13;
Nebraska:Neb.Rev.Stat. §§86-707.2, 86-707.15;
Nevada: Nev.Rev.Stat. §200.690;
New Hampshire: N.H.Rev.Stat.Ann. §570-A:11;
New Jersey: N.J.Stat.Ann. §§2A:156-24;
New Mexico: N.M.Stat.Ann. §§30-12-11;
North Carolina: N.C.Gen.Stat. §15A-296;
Ohio: Ohio Rev.Code §2953.65;
Oregon: Ore.Rev.Stat. §133.739;
Pennsylvania: Pa.Stat.Ann. tit.18 §§5725, 5747;
Rhode Island: R.I.Gen.Laws §12-5.1-13;
Tennessee: Tenn.Code Ann. §39-13-603;
Texas: Tex.Civ.Pract. & Pro. §§123.001-123.004;
Utah: Utah Code Ann. §§77-23a-11; 77-23b-8;
Virginia: Va.Code §19.2-69;
Washington: Wash.Rev.Code Ann. §9.73.060;
West Virginia: W.Va.Code §62-1D-12;
Wisconsin: Wis.Stat.Ann. §968.31;
Wyoming: Wyo.Stat. §7-3-609; 
District of Columbia: D.C.Code §23-554.  
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Court Authorized Interception Under State Law
Alaska: Alaska Stats. §§12.37.010 to 12.37.130;
Arizona: Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. §§13-3010 to 13-3017;
California: Cal.Penal Code §629 to 629.98;
Colorado: Colo.Rev.Stat. §§16-15-101 to 16-15-104;
Connecticut: Conn.Gen.Stat.Ann. §§54-41a to 54-41t;
Delaware: Del.Code tit.11 §§2401 to 2412;
Florida: Fla.Stat.Ann. §§934.02 to 934.43;
Georgia: Ga.Code §16-11-64;
Hawaii: Hawaii Rev.Stat. §§803-41 to 803-49;
Idaho: Idaho Code §§18-6706 to 18-6725;
Illinois: Ill.Stat.Ann. ch.725 §§5/108A-1 to 108B-14;
Indiana:Ind.Code §§35-33.5-1-1 to 35-33.5-5-6;
Iowa: Iowa Code Ann. §§808B.3 to 808B.5;
Kansas: Kan.Stat.Ann. §§22-2401 to 22-2414;
Louisiana: La.Rev.Stat.Ann. §§15:1301 to 15:1316;
Maryland: Md.Cts. & Jud.Pro.Code Ann. §§10-401 to 10-
410;
Massachusetts: Mass.Gen.Laws Ann. ch.272 §99;
Minnesota: Minn.Stat.Ann. §§626A.01 to 626.41;
Mississippi: Miss.Code §§41-29-501 to 41-29-537;
Missouri: Mo.Ann.Stat. §§542.400 to 542.424;
Nebraska: Neb.Rev.Stat. §§86-701 to 86-712;
Nevada: Nev.Rev.Stat. §§179.410 to 179.515;
New Hampshire: N.H.Rev.Stat.Ann. §§570-A:1 to 570-
A:9;
New Jersey: N.J.Stat.Ann. §§2A:156A-8 to 2A:156A-23;
New Mexico: N.M.Stat.Ann. §§30-12-1 to 30-12-14;
New York: N.Y.Crime.Pro. Law §§700.05 to 700.70;
North Carolina: N.C.Gen.Stat. §§15A-286 to 15A-298;
North Dakota: N.D.Cent.Code §§29-29.2-01 to 29-29.2-
05;
Ohio: Ohio Rev.Code §§2933.51 to 2933.66;
Oklahoma: Okla.Stat.Ann. tit.13 §§176.1 to 176.14
Oregon: Ore.Rev.Stat. §§133.721 to 133.739;
Pennsylvania: Pa.Stat.Ann. tit.18 §§5701 to 5728
Rhode Island: R.I.Gen.Laws §§12-5.1-1 to 12-5.1-16;
South Dakota: S.D.Cod.Laws §§23A-35A-1 to 23A-35A-
34
Tennessee: Tenn.Code Ann. §§40-6-301 to 40-6-311;
Texas: Tex.Crim.Pro. Code. §18.20;
Utah: Utah Code Ann. §§77-23a-1 to 77-23a-16;
Virginia: Va.Code §§19.2-61 to 19.2-70.3;
Washington: Wash.Rev.Code Ann. §§9.73.040 to
9.73.250;
West Virginia: W.Va.Code §§62-1D-1 to 62-1D-16;
Wisconsin: Wis.Stat.Ann. §§968.27 to 968.33;
Wyoming: Wyo.Stat. §§7-3-601 to 7-3-611;




State Statutes Regulating Stored Electronic Communications (SE),
 Pen Registers (PR) and Trap and Trace Devices (T)
Alaska: Alaska Stats. §§12.37.200 (PR&T),
12.37.300(SE); 
Arizona: Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. §§13-3016 (SE), 13-3017
(PR&T);
Delaware: Del.Code tit.11 §§2421 to 2426 (SE), 2430 to
2434 (PR&T);
Florida: Fla.Stat.Ann. §§934.21 (SE), 934.32 to
934.34(PR&T);
Georgia: Ga.Code Ann. §§16-11-60 to 16-11-64.2;
Hawaii: Hawaii Rev.Stat. §§803-44.5, 803-44.6 (PR&T),
803-47.5 to 803.47.9 (SE);
Idaho: Idaho Code §§18-6721 to 18-6723 (PR&T);
Iowa: Iowa Code Ann. §§808B.10 to 808B.14;
Kansas: Kan.Stat.Ann. §§22-2525 to 22-2529 (PR&T);
Louisiana: La.Rev.Stat.Ann. §§15:1313 to 15:1316
(PR&T);
Maryland: Md.Cts. & Jud.Pro.Code Ann. §§10-4A-01 to
10-4A-08 (SE), 10-4B-01 to 10-4B-05 (PR&T);
Minnesota: Minn.Stat.Ann. §§626A.24 (SE), 626A.35 TO
636A.391 (PR&T);
Mississippi; Miss.Code §41-29-701(PR&T);
Montana: Mont.Code Ann. §§46-4-401 TO 46-4-
404(PR&T);
Nebraska: Neb.Rev.Stat. §§86-707.3 to 86-707.07
(PR&T), 86-707.09 to 86-707.14 (SE);
Nevada: Nev.Rev.Stat. §§179.530 (PR&T), 205.492 TO
205.513(SE); 
New Hampshire: N.H.Rev.Stat.Ann. §§570-B:1 to 570-B:7
(PR&T);
New Jersey; N.J.Stat.Ann. §§2A:156A-27 to 2A:156A-34
(SE);
New York: N.Y.Crim.Pro.Law  §§750.00 to 750.35
(PR&T);
North Carolina: N.C.Gen.Stat. §§15A-260 to 15A-264
(PR&T);
North Dakota: N.D.Cent.Code §§29-29.3-01 to 29-29.3-05
(PR&T);
Ohio: Ohio Rev.Code §2933.76 (PR&T);
Oklahoma: Okla.Stat.Ann. tit.13 §177.1 to 177.5 (PR&T);
Oregon: Ore.Rev.Stat. §§165.657 to 165.659 (PR&T);
Pennsylvania: Pa.Stat.Ann. tit.18 §§5741 to 5748 (SE),
5771 to 5775 (PR&T);
Rhode Island; R.I.Gen.Laws §§12-5.2-1 to 12-5.2-5
(PR&T);
South Carolina: S.C.Code §§17-29-10 to 17-29-50
(PR&T);
South Dakota: S.D.Cod.Laws §§23A-35A-22 to 23A-35A-
34 (PR&T);
Tennessee: Tenn.Code Ann. §40-6-311 (PR&T);
Texas: Tex.Code of Crim.Pro. art. 18.21 (SE, PR&T);
Utah: Utah Code Ann. §§77-23a-14 (PR&T), 77-23b-2 to
77-23b-9(SE);
Virginia: Va.Code §§19.2-70.2 (PR&T), 19.2-70.3 (SE);
West Virginia: W.Va.Code §62-1D-10 (PR&T);
Wisconsin: Wis.Stat.Ann. §968.30 to 968.37 (PR&T).
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State Computer Crime Statutes
Alabama: Ala.Code §§13A-8-100 to 13A-8-103;
Alaska: Alaska Stat. §11.46.740;
Arizona: Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. §13-2316;
Arkansas: Ark.Code §§5-41-101 to 5-41-108;
California: Cal.Penal Code §502;
Colorado: Colo.Rev.Stat. §§18-5.5-101, 18-5.5-102;
Connecticut: Conn.Gen.Stat.Ann. §§53a-250 to 53a-261;
Delaware: Del.Code tit.11 §§931 to 939;
Florida: Fla.Stat.Ann. §§815.01 to 815.07;
Georgia: Ga.Code §§16-9-92 to 16-9-64;
Hawaii: Hawaii Rev.Stat. §708-890 to 708-896;
Idaho: Idaho Code §§18-2201, 18-2202;
Illinois: Ill.Stat.Ann. ch.720 §§5/16D-1 to 5/16D-7;
Indiana: Ind.Code §§35-43-2-4 to 35-43-2-3;
Iowa: Iowa Code Ann. §§716A.1 to 716A.16;
Kansas: Kan.Stat.Ann. §21-3755;
Kentucky:Ky.Rev.Stat. §§434.840 to 434.860;
Louisiana: La.Rev.Stat.Ann. §§14:73.1 to 14:73.5;
Maine: Me.Rev.Stat.Ann. ch.17-A §§431 to 433;
Maryland: Md.Code Ann. art. 27 §146;
Massachusetts: Mass.Gen.Laws Ann. ch.266 §33A;
Michigan: Mich.Comp.Laws Ann. §§752.791 to 752.797;
Minnesota: Minn.Stat.Ann. §§609.87 to 609.893;
Mississippi: Miss.Code §§97-45-1 to 97-45-13;
Missouri: Mo.Ann.Stat. §§569.093 to 569.099;
Montana: Mont.Code Ann. §§45-6-310, 45-6-311;
Nebraska: Neb.Rev.Stat. §§28-1341 to 28-1348;
Nevada: Nev.Rev.Stat. §§205.473 to 205.491;
New Hampshire: N.H.Rev.Stat.Ann. §638:16 to 638:19;
New Jersey: N.J.Stat.Ann. §§2C:20-23 to 2C:20-33;
New Mexico: N.M.Stat.Ann. §§30-20-1 to 30-20-7;
New York: N.Y.Penal Law §§156.00 to 156.50;
North Carolina: N.C.Gen.Stat. §§14-453 to 14-456;
North Dakota: N.D.Cent.Code §12.1-06.1-08;
Ohio: Ohio Rev.Code §§2913.01 to 2913.42;
Oklahoma: Okla.Stat.Ann. tit.21 §§1951 to 1958;
Oregon: Ore.Rev.Stat. §164.371;
Pennsylvania: Pa.Stat.Ann. tit.18 §3933;
Rhode Island: R.I.Gen.Laws §§11-52-1 to 11-52-8;
South Carolina: S.C.Code §§16-16-10 to 16-16-40;
South Dakota: S.D.Cod.Laws §§43-43B-1 to 43-43B-8;
Tennessee: Tenn.Code Ann. §§39-14-601 to 39-14-603;
Texas: Tex.Penal Code. §§33.01 to 33.03;
Utah: Utah Code Ann. §§76-6-702 to 76-6-705;
Virginia: Va.Code §§18.2-152.1 to 18.2-152.14;
Washington: Wash.Rev.Code Ann. §§9A.52.110 to
9A.52.130;
West Virginia: W.Va.Code §§61-3C-1 to 61-3C-21;
Wisconsin: Wis.Stat.Ann. §943.70;
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